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Abstract
We propose a new family of fairness definitions for classification problems that combine
some of the best properties of both statistical and individual notions of fairness. We posit not
only a distribution over individuals, but also a distribution over (or collection of) classification
tasks. We then ask that standard statistics (such as error or false positive/negative rates) be
(approximately) equalized across individuals, where the rate is defined as an expectation over
the classification tasks. Because we are no longer averaging over coarse groups (such as race
or gender), this is a semantically meaningful individual-level constraint. Given a sample of
individuals and classification problems, we design an oracle-efficient algorithm (i.e. one that
is given access to any standard, fairness-free learning heuristic) for the fair empirical risk
minimization task. We also show that given sufficiently many samples, the ERM solution
generalizes in two directions: both to new individuals, and to new classification tasks, drawn
from their corresponding distributions. Finally we implement our algorithm and empirically
verify its effectiveness.
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1 Introduction
The community studying fairness in machine learning has yet to settle on definitions. At a
high level, existing definitional proposals can be divided into two groups: statistical fairness
definitions and individual fairness definitions. Statistical fairness definitions partition individuals
into “protected groups” (often based on race, gender, or some other binary protected attribute)
and ask that some statistic of a classifier (error rate, false positive rate, positive classification
rate, etc.) be approximately equalized across those groups. In contrast, individual definitions
of fairness have no notion of “protected groups”, and instead ask for constraints that bind on
pairs of individuals. These constraints can have the semantics that “similar individuals should
be treated similarly” ([Dwork et al., 2012]), or that “less qualified individuals should not be
preferentially favored over more qualified individuals” ([Joseph et al., 2016]). Both families
of definitions have serious problems, which we will elaborate on. But in summary, statistical
definitions of fairness provide only very weak promises to individuals, and so do not have very
strong semantics. Existing proposals for individual fairness guarantees, on the other hand, have
very strong semantics, but have major obstacles to deployment, requiring strong assumptions on
either the data generating process or on society’s ability to instantiate an agreed-upon fairness
metric.
Statistical definitions of fairness are the most popular in the literature, in large part because
they can be easily checked and enforced on arbitrary data distributions. For example, a popular
definition ([Hardt et al., 2016, Kleinberg et al., 2017, Chouldechova, 2017]) asks that a classifier’s
false positive rate should be equalized across the protected groups. This can sound attractive:
in settings in which a positive classification leads to a bad outcome (e.g. incarceration), it is
the false positives that are harmed by the errors of the classifier, and asking that the false
positive rate be equalized across groups is asking that the harm caused by the algorithm should
be proportionately spread across protected populations. But the meaning of this guarantee to
an individual is limited, because the word rate refers to an average over the population. To
see why this limits the meaning of the guarantee, consider the example given in [Kearns et al.,
2018]: imagine a society that is equally split between gender (Male, Female) and race (Blue,
Green). Under the constraint that false positive rates be equalized across both race and gender,
a classifier may incarcerate 100% of blue men and green women, and 0% of green men and blue
women. This equalizes the false positive rate across all protected groups, but is cold comfort to
any individual blue man and green woman. This effect isn’t merely hypothetical — [Kearns et al.,
2018, Kearns et al., 2019] showed similar effects when using off-the-shelf fairness constrained
learning techniques on real datasets.
Individual definitions of fairness, on the other hand, can have strong individual level semantics.
For example, the constraint imposed by [Joseph et al., 2016, Joseph et al., 2018] in online
classification problems implies that the false positive rate must be equalized across all pairs of
individuals who (truly) have negative labels. Here the word rate has been redefined to refer to
an expectation over the randomness of the classifier, and there is no notion of protected groups.
This kind of constraint provides a strong individual level promise that one’s risk of being harmed
by the errors of the classifier are no higher than they are for anyone else. Unfortunately, in
order to non-trivially satisfy a constraint like this, it is necessary to make strong realizability
assumptions.
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1.1 Our Results
We propose an alternative definition of individual fairness that avoids the need to make assump-
tions on the data generating process, while giving the learning algorithm more flexibility to
satisfy it in non-trivial ways. We consider that in many applications each individual will be
subject to decisions made by many classification tasks over a given period of time, not just one.
For example, internet users are shown a large number of targeted ads over the course of their
usage of a platform, not just one: the properties of the advertisers operating in the platform over
a period of time are not known up front, but have some statistical regularities. Public school
admissions in cities like New York are handled by a centralized match: students apply not just
to one school, but to many, who can each make their own admissions decisions ([Abdulkadirog˘lu
et al., 2005]). We model this by imagining that not only is there an unknown distribution P
over individuals, but there is an unknown distribution Q over classification problems (each of
which is represented by an unknown mapping from individual features to target labels). With
this model in hand, we can now ask that the error rates (or false positive or negative rates) be
equalized across all individuals — where now rate is defined as the average over classification
tasks drawn from Q of the probability of a particular individual being incorrectly classified.
We then derive a new oracle-efficient algorithm for satisfying this guarantee in-sample, and
prove novel generalization guarantees showing that the guarantees of our algorithm hold also out
of sample. Oracle efficiency is an attractive framework in which to circumvent the worst-case
hardness of even unconstrained learning problems, and focus on the additional computational
difficulty imposed by fairness constraints. It assumes the existence of “oracles” (in practice,
implemented with a heuristic) that can solve weighted classification problems absent fairness
constraints, and asks for efficient reductions from the fairness constrained learning problems
to unconstrained problems. This has become a popular technique in the fair machine learning
literature (see e.g. [Agarwal et al., 2018, Kearns et al., 2018]) — and one that often leads
to practical algorithms. The generalization guarantees we prove require the development of
new techniques because they refer to generalization in two orthogonal directions — over both
individuals and classification problems. Our algorithm is run on a sample of n individuals
sampled from P and m problems sampled from Q. It is given access to an oracle (in practice,
implemented with a heuristic) for solving ordinary cost sensitive classification problems over
some hypothesis space H. The algorithm runs in polynomial time (it performs only elementary
calculations except for calls to the learning oracle, and makes only a polynomial number of
calls to the oracle) and returns a mapping from problems to hypotheses that have the following
properties, so long as n and m are sufficiently large (polynomial in the VC-dimension of H and
the desired error parameters): For any α, with high probability over the draw of the n individuals
from P and the m problems from Q
1. Accuracy : the error rate (computed in expectation over new individuals x „ P and new
problems f „ Q) is within Opαq of the optimal mapping from problems to classifiers in H,
subject to the constraint that for every pair of individuals x, x1 in the support of P, the
error rates (or false positive or negative rates) (computed in expectation over problems
f „ Q) on x and x1 differ by at most α.
2. Fairness : with probability 1´ β over the draw of new individuals x, x1 „ P , the error rate
(or false positive or negatives rates) of the output mapping (computed in expectation over
problems f „ Q) on x will be within Opαq of that of x1.
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The mapping from new classification problems to hypotheses that we find is derived from the
dual variables of the linear program representing our empirical risk minimization task, and we
crucially rely on the structure of this mapping to prove our generalization guarantees for new
problems f „ Q.
1.2 Additional Related Work
The literature on fairness in machine learning has become much too large to comprehensively
summarize, but see [Mitchell et al., 2018] for a recent survey. Here we focus on the most
conceptually related work, which has aimed to bridge the gap between the immediate applicability
of statistical definitions of fairness with the strong individual level semantics of individual notions
of fairness. One strand of this literature focuses on the “metric fairness” definition first proposed
by [Dwork et al., 2012], and aims to ease the assumption that the learning algorithm has access
to a task specific fairness metric. [Kim et al., 2018a] imagine access to an oracle which can
provide unbiased estimates to the metric distance between any pair of individuals, and show
how to use this to satisfy a statistical notion of fairness representing “average metric fairness”
over pre-defined groups. [Gillen et al., 2018] study a contextual bandit learning setting in which
a human judge points out metric fairness violations whenever they occur, and show that with
this kind of feedback (under assumptions about consistency with a family of metrics), it is
possible to quickly converge to the optimal fair policy. [Yona and Rothblum, 2018] consider a
PAC-based relaxation of metric fair learning, and show that empirical metric-fairness generalizes
to out-of-sample metric fairness. Another strand of this literature has focused on mitigating the
problems that arise when statistical notions of fairness are imposed over coarsely defined groups,
by instead asking for statistical notions of fairness over exponentially many or infinitely many
groups with a well defined structure. This line includes [He´bert-Johnson et al., 2018] (focusing
on calibration), [Kearns et al., 2018] (focusing on false positive and negative rates), and [Kim
et al., 2018b] (focusing on error rates).
2 Model and Preliminaries
We model each individual in our framework by a vector of features x P X , and we let each learning
problem1 be represented by a binary function f P F mapping X to t0, 1u. We assume probability
measures P and Q over the space of individuals X and the space of problems F , respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume throughout that the support of the distributions P and Q
are X and F , respectively. In the training phase there is a fixed (across problems) set X “ txiuni“1
of n individuals sampled independently from P for which we have available labels of m learning
tasks represented by F “ tfjumj“1 drawn independently from Q2. Therefore, a training data set of
n individuals X for m learning tasks F takes the form: S “  xi, pfjpxiqqmj“1 (ni“1. We summarize
the notations we use for individuals and problems in Table 1.
In general the function class F will be unknown. We will aim to solve the (agnostic) learning
problem over a hypothesis class H, which need bear no relationship to F . We assume throughout
that H contains the constant classifiers h0 and h1 where h0pxq “ 0 and h1pxq “ 1 for all x. This
1we will use the terms: problem, task, and labeling interchangeably.
2Throughout we will use subscript i to denote individuals and j to denote learning problems.
5
Table 1: Summary of notations for individuals vs. problems.
space element distribution data set sample size empirical dist.
individual X x P X P X “ txiuni“1 n pP “ U pXq
problem F f P F Q F “ tfjumj“1 m pQ “ U pF q
assumption will allow us to argue about feasibility of the constrained optimization problems that
we will solve. We allow for randomized classifiers, which we model as learning over ∆pHq, the
probability simplex over H.
Unlike usual learning settings where the primary goal is to learn a single hypothesis p P ∆pHq,
our objective is to learn a mapping ψ P ∆pHqF that maps learning tasks f P F represented as
labelings of the training data to hypotheses p P ∆pHq. We will therefore have to formally define
the error rates incurred by a mapping ψ and use them to formalize a learning task subject to our
proposed fairness notion. For a mapping ψ, we write ψf to denote the classifier corresponding to
f P F under the mapping, i.e., ψf “ ψ pfq P ∆pHq.
Notice in the training phase, there are only m learning problems F “ tfjumj“1 to be solved, and
therefore, the corresponding empirical fair learning problem reduces to learning m randomized
classifiers p “ pp1, p2, . . . , pmq P ∆pHqm, where pj is the learned classifier for the jth problem
fj P F . In general, learning m specific classifiers for the training problems might not give any
generalizable rule mapping new problems to hypotheses — but the specific algorithm we propose
will, in the form of a set of weights (derived from the dual variables of the ERM problem) over
the training individuals.
2.1 AIF: Average Individual Fairness
Definition 2.1 (Individual and Overall Error Rates of a Mapping ψ). For a given individual
x P X , a mapping ψ P ∆pHqF , and distributions P and Q over X and F , the individual error
rate of x incurred by ψ is defined as follows:
E px, ψ;Qq “ E
f„Q
„
P
h„ψf
rhpxq ‰ fpxqs

The overall error rate of ψ is:
err pψ;P,Qq “ E
x„P rE px, ψ;Qqs
In the body of this paper, we will focus on a fairness constraint that asks that the individual
error rate should be approximately equalized across all individuals. In Section A of the Appendix,
we extend our techniques to equalizing false positive and negative rates across individuals.
Definition 2.2 (Average Individual Fairness (AIF)). In our framework, we say a mapping
ψ P ∆pHqF satisfies “pα, βq-AIF” (reads pα, βq-approximate Average Individual Fairness) with
respect to the distributions pP,Qq if there exists γ ě 0 such that:
P
x„P p|E px, ψ;Qq ´ γ| ą αq ď β
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2.2 Notations
We briefly fix some notations:
• For an event A, 1 rAs represents the indicator function of A. 1 rAs “ 1 if A occurs.
• For a natural number n P N, rns “ t1, 2, . . . , nu.
• U pSq represents the uniform distribution over the set S.
• For a mapping ψ : AÑ B and A1 Ď A, ψ|A1 represents ψ restricted to the domain A1.
• For a hypothesis class H, ∆pHq represents the probability simplex over H.
• dH denotes the VC dimension of the hypothesis class H.
• CSCpHq denotes a cost sensitive classification oracle for H which is defined below.
Definition 2.3 (Cost Sensitive Classification (CSC) in H). Let D “ txi, c1i , c0i uni“1 denote a
data set of n individuals xi where c
1
i and c
0
i are the costs of classifying xi as positive (1) and
negative (0) respectively. Given D, the cost sensitive classification problem defined over H is the
optimization problem:
arg min
hPH
nÿ
i“1
 
c1ihpxiq ` c0i p1´ hpxiqq
(
An oracle CSCpHq takes the data set D “ txi, c1i , c0i uni“1 as input and outputs the solution to the
optimization problem. We use CSCpH;Dq to denote the classifier returned by CSCpHq on an
input data set D. We say that an algorithm is oracle efficient if it runs in polynomial time given
the ability to make unit-time calls to CSCpHq.
3 Learning subject to AIF
In this section we first cast the learning problem subject to the AIF fairness constraints as the
constrained optimization problem (1) and then develop an oracle efficient algorithm for solving
its corresponding empirical risk minimization (ERM) problem (in the spirit of [Agarwal et al.,
2018]). In the coming sections we give a full analysis of the developed algorithm including its
in-sample accuracy/fairness guarantees, and define the mapping it induces from new problems to
hypotheses, and finally establish out-of-sample bounds for this trained mapping.
Fair Learning Problem subject to (α, 0)-AIF
min
ψ P∆pHqF , γ P r0,1s
err pψ;P,Qq
s.t. @x P X : |E px, ψ;Qq ´ γ| ď α
(1)
Definition 3.1 (OPT). Consider the optimization problem (1). Given distributions P and Q,
and fairness approximation parameter α, we denote the optimal solutions of (1) by ψ‹ pα;P,Qq
and γ‹ pα;P,Qq, and the value of the objective function at these optimal points by OPT pα;P,Qq.
In other words
OPT pα;P,Qq “ err pψ‹;P,Qq
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We will use OPT as the benchmark with respect to which we evaluate the accuracy of our trained
mapping. It is worth noticing that the optimization problem (1) has a nonempty set of feasible
points for any α and any distributions P and Q because the following point is always feasible:
γ “ 0.5 and ψf “ 0.5h0 ` 0.5h1 (i.e. random classification) for all f P F where h0 and h1 are
all-zero and all-one constant classifiers.
3.1 The Empirical Fair Learning Problem
We start to develop our algorithm by defining the empirical version of (1) for a given training
data set of n individuals X “ txiuni“1 and m learning problems F “ tfjumj“1. We will formulate
the empirical problem as finding a restricted mapping ψ|F by which we mean the domain of
the mapping is restricted to the training set F Ď F . We will later see how the dynamics of our
proposed algorithm allows us to extend the restricted mapping to a mapping from the entire
space F . We slightly change notation and represent a restricted mapping ψ|F P ∆pHqF explicitly
by a vector p “ pp1, . . . , pmq P ∆pHqm of randomized classifiers where pj P ∆pHq corresponds
to fj P F . Notice the empirical versions of the overall error rate and the individual error rates
incurred by the mapping p (see Definition 2.1) can be expressed as:
err
´
p; pP, pQ¯ “ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯ “ 1
m
mÿ
j“1
1
n
nÿ
i“1
P
hj„ pj
rhjpxiq ‰ fjpxiqs (2)
E
´
x,p; pQ¯ “ 1
m
mÿ
j“1
P
hj„ pj
rhjpxq ‰ fjpxqs (3)
Using these empirical quantities, we cast the empirical version of the fair learning problem (1) as
the constrained optimization problem (4) where there is one constraint for each individual in the
training data set. Note that the optimization problem (4) forms a linear program and that we
considered a slightly relaxed version of (1) where instead of pα, 0q-AIF, we require p2α, 0q-AIF
(of course now with respect to the empirical distributions) only to make sure the optimal solution
pψ‹, γ‹q of (1) (in fact ψ‹ restricted to F ) is feasible in (4) as long as enough samples are acquired.
This will appear later in the generalization analysis of our proposed algorithm.
Empirical Fair Learning Problem
min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
err
´
p; pP, pQ¯
s.t. @i P t1, . . . , nu:
ˇˇˇ
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ď 2α (4)
3.2 A Reductions Approach: Formulation as a Two-player Game
We use the dual perspective of constrained optimization problems to reduce the fair ERM (4) to
a two-player game between a “Learner” (primal player) and an “Auditor” (dual player). Towards
8
deriving the Lagrangian of (4), we first rewrite its constraints in rpp, γ; pQq ď 0 form where
r
´
p, γ; pQ¯ “
»–E ´xi,p; pQ¯´ γ ´ 2α
γ ´ E
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ 2α
fifln
i“1
P R2n (5)
represents the “fairness violations” of the pair pp, γq in one single vector. Let the corresponding
dual variables be represented by λ “ “λ`i ,λ´i ‰ni“1 P Λ, where Λ “ tλ P R2n` | ||λ||1 ď Bu. Note
we place an upper bound B on the `1-norm of λ in order to reason about the convergence of
our proposed algorithm. B will eventually factor into both the run-time and the approximation
guarantees of our solution. Using Equation (5) and the introduced dual variables, we have that
the Lagrangian of (4) is
L pp, γ,λq “ err
´
p; pP, pQ¯` λTr ´p, γ; pQ¯ (6)
We therefore consider solving the following minmax problem:
min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
max
λPΛ L pp, γ,λq “ maxλPΛ minp P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s L pp, γ,λq (7)
where strong duality holds because L is linear in its arguments and the domains of pp, γq and
λ are convex and compact ([Sion, 1958]). From a game theoretic perspective, the solution to
this minmax problem can be seen as an equilibrium of a zero-sum game between two players.
The primal player (Learner) has strategy space ∆pHqm ˆ r0, 1s while the dual player (Auditor)
has strategy space Λ, and given a pair of chosen strategies pp, γ,λq, the Lagrangian L pp, γ,λq
represents how much the Learner has to pay to the Auditor — i.e. it defines the payoff function
of a zero-sum game in which the Learner is the minimization player, and the Auditor is the
maximization player.
Using no regret dynamics, an approximate equilibrium of this zero-sum game can be found in
an iterative framework. In each iteration, we let the dual player run the exponentiated gradient
descent algorithm and the primal player best respond. The best response problem of the Learner
can be decoupled into pm`1q separate minimization problems and that in particular, the optimal
classifiers p can be viewed as the solutions to m weighted classification problems in H where all
m problems share the same weights w “ rλ`i ´ λ´i si P Rn over the training individuals. In the
following subsection, we derive and implement the best response of the Learner where we use the
learning oracle CSCpHq (see Definition 2.3) to solve the weighted classification problems.
3.3 BEST: The Learner’s Best Response
We formally describe and analyze the best response problem of the Learner in this subsection and
summarize the results in a subroutine called BEST. In each iteration of the described iterative
framework, the Learner is given some λ P Λ picked by the Auditor and she wants to solve the
following minimization problem.
arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
L pp, γ,λq
We will use Equations (2) and (3) to expand the Lagrangian (6) and decouple the above
minimization problem into pm` 1q minimization problems, each depends only on one variable
the Learner has to pick.
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arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
L pp, γ,λq
” arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
err
´
p; pP, pQ¯` nÿ
i“1
!
λ`i
´
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ γ¯` λ´i ´γ ´ E ´xi,p; pQ¯¯)
” arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
1
n
nÿ
i“1
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯` nÿ
i“1
!
λ`i
´
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ γ¯` λ´i ´γ ´ E ´xi;p; pQ¯¯)
” arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
nÿ
i“1
 
λ´i ´ λ`i
(
γ `
nÿ
i“1
ˆ
1
n
` λ`i ´ λ´i
˙
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯
” arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
nÿ
i“1
 
λ´i ´ λ`i
(
γ ` 1
m
mÿ
j“1
#
nÿ
i“1
ˆ
1
n
` λ`i ´ λ´i
˙
P
hj„ pj
rhjpxiq ‰ fjpxiqs
+
Therefore, the minimization problem of the Learner gets nicely decoupled into pm`1qminimization
problems. Let wi “ λ`i ´ λ´i for all i, and acccordingly, let w “ rw1, . . . , wnsJ P Rn. First, the
optimal value for γ is chosen according to
γ “ 1
«
nÿ
i“1
wi ą 0
ff
(8)
And for learning problem j, the following minimization problem must be solved.
arg min
pj P∆pHq
nÿ
i“1
p1{n` wiq P
hj„ pj
rhjpxiq ‰ fjpxiqs ” arg min
hj PH
nÿ
i“1
p1{n` wiq1 rhjpxiq ‰ fjpxiqs
where the equivalence holds since the Learner can choose to put all the probability mass on a
single classifier. This minimization problem represents exactly a weighted classification problem.
Since we work with cost sensitive classification oracles in this paper, we further reduce the
weighted classification problem to a CSC problem that can be solved by a call to the CSC oracle
for H (CSCpHq). For problem j P rms, let
c1i,j “ pwi ` 1{nqp1´ fjpxiqq , c0i,j “ pwi ` 1{nqfjpxiq
represent the costs associated with individual i P rns. Observe that the above weighted classifica-
tion problem can be now casted as the following CSC problem.
hj “ arg min
h PH
nÿ
i“1
c1i,j hpxiq ` c0i,j p1´ hpxiqq (9)
To sum up, in each iteration of the algorithm the Auditor first uses the exponentiated gradient
descent algorithm to update the dual variable λ (or correspondingly, the vector of weights w
over the training individuals) and then the Learner picks γ “ 1 rřni“1wi ą 0s and solves m cost
sensitive classification problems casted in (9) by calling the oracle CSCpHq for all 1 ď j ď m.
We have the best response of the Learner written in Subroutine 1. This subroutine will be called
in each iteration of the final AIF learning algorithm.
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Subroutine 1: BEST– best response of the Learner in the AIF setting
Input: dual weights w P Rn, training examples S “
!
xi, pfjpxiqqmj“1
)n
i“1
γ Ð 1 rřni“1wi ą 0s
for j “ 1, . . . ,m do
c1i Ð pwi ` 1{nqp1´ fjpxiqq for i P rns.
c0i Ð pwi ` 1{nqfjpxiq for i P rns.
D Ð txi, c1i , c0i uni“1
hj Ð CSC pH;Dq
end
hÐ ph1, h2, . . . , hmq
Output:
´
h, γ
¯
3.4 AIF-Learn: Implementation and In-sample Guarantees
In Algorithm 2 (AIF-Learn), with a slight deviation from what we described in the previous
subsections, we implement the proposed algorithm. The deviation arises when the Auditor updates
the dual variables λ in each round, and is introduced in the service of arguing for generalization.
To counteract the inherent adaptivity of the algorithm (which makes the quantities estimated
at each round data dependent), at each round t of the algorithm, we draw a fresh batch of m0
problems to estimate the fairness violation vector r (5). From another viewpoint – which is the
way the algorithm is actually implemented – similar to usual batch learning models we assume
we have a training set F of m learning problems upfront. However, in our proposed algorithm
that runs for T iterations, we partition F into T equally-sized (m0) subsets tFtuTt“1 uniformly
at random and use only the batch of problems Ft at round t to update the dual variables λ.
Without loss of generality and to avoid technical complications, we assume |Ft| “ m0 “ m{T is
a natural number. This is represented in Algorithm 2 by writing pQt “ U pFtq for the uniform
distribution over the batch of problems Ft , and ht|Ft for the associated learned classifiers for
Ft. We will see this modification will only introduce an extra rOpa1{m0q term to the regret of
the Auditor and thus we have to assume m0 is sufficiently large (Assumption 3.1) so that the
Auditor has in fact low regret.
Notice AIF-Learn takes as input an approximation parameter ν P r0, 1s which will quantify
how close the output of the algorithm is to an equilibrium of the introduced game, and it will
accordingly propagate to the accuracy bounds. One important aspect of AIF-Learn is that the
algorithm maintains a vector of weights wt P Rn over the training individuals X and that each pj
learned by our algorithm is in fact an average over T classifiers where classifier t is the solution
to a CSC problem on X weighted by wt. As a consequence, we propose to extend the learned
restricted mapping p P ∆pHqm to a mapping pψ “ pψ pX,xW q P ∆pHqF that takes any problem
f P F as input (represented to pψ by the labels it induces on the training individuals), uses X
along with the set of weights xW “ twtuTt“1 to solve T CSC problems in a similar fashion, and
outputs the average of the learned classifiers denoted by pψf P ∆pHq. This extension is consistent
with p in the sense that pψ restricted to F will be exactly the p output by our algorithm. We
have the pseudocode for pψ written in detail in Mapping 3 and we let AIF-Learn output pψ.
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Algorithm 2: AIF-Learn – learning subject to AIF
Input: fairness parameter α, approximation parameter ν,
training data set X “ txiuni“1 and F “ tfjumj“1
B Ð 1`2να , T Ð 16B
2p1`2αq2 logp2n`1q
ν2
, η Ð ν
4p1`2αq2B , m0 Ð mT , S Ð
!
xi, pfjpxiqqmj“1
)n
i“1
Partition F uniformly at random: F “ tFtuTt“1 where |Ft| “ m0.
θ1 Ð 0 P R2n
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
λ‚i,t Ð B exppθ
‚
i,tq
1`ři1,‚1 exppθ‚1i1,tq for i P rns and ‚ P t`,´u
wt Ð rλ`i,t ´ λ´i,tsni“1 P Rn
pht, γtq Ð BESTpwt;Sq
θt`1 Ð θt ` η ¨ r
´
ht|Ft , γt; pQt¯
endp Ð 1T řTt“1 ht , pγ Ð 1T řTt“1 γt , pλÐ 1T řTt“1 λt , xW Ð twtuTt“1
Output: average plays
´p, pγ, pλ¯, mapping pψ “ pψ ´X,xW¯ (see Mapping 3)
We start the analysis of Algorithm 2 by establishing the regret bound of the Auditor over T
rounds of the algorithm. The regret bound will help us pick the number of iterations T and
the learning rate η so that the Auditor has sufficiently small regret (bounded by ν). Notice the
Learner uses her best response in each round of the algorithm which implies that she has zero
regret. Since in this subsection we eventually want to state in-sample guarantees (i.e., guarantees
with respect to the distributions pP and pQ), we work with the restricted mapping pψ|F “ p. In
the next subsection we will focus on generalizations in our framework and there we will have to
state the guarantees for the mapping pψ. We defer all the proofs to the Appendix
Lemma 3.1 (Regret of the Auditor). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let tλtuTt“1 be the sequence of exponentiated
gradient descent plays (with learning rate η) by the Auditor to the given tht, γtuTt“1 of the Learner
over T rounds of Algorithm 2. We have that for any set of individuals X, with probability at
Mapping 3: pψ pX,xW q – pseudocode for the mapping pψ output by Algorithm 2
Input: f P F (represented to pψ as tfpxiquni“1)
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
c1i Ð pwi,t ` 1{nqp1´ fpxiqq for i P rns
c0i Ð pwi,t ` 1{nqfpxiq for i P rns
D Ð txi, c1i , c0i uni“1
hf,wt Ð CSC pH;Dq
endpψf Ð 1T řTt“1 hf,wt
Output: pψf P ∆pHq
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least 1´ δ over the problems F , the (average) regret of the Auditor is bounded as follows.
1
T
max
λPΛ
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λ
¯
´ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
ď B
d
log p2nT {δq
2m0
` B log p2n` 1q
ηT
` ηB p1` 2αq2
The last two terms appearing in the above regret bound come from the usual regret analysis of
the exponentiated gradient descent algorithm. However, the first term originates from a high
probability Chernoff-Hoeffding bound because as explained before, the Auditor is using — instead
of the whole set of problems F — only m0 randomly selected problem Ft to estimate the vector
of fairness violations r at round t. Hence at each round t, the difference of fairness violation
estimates — one with respect to Ft and another with respect to F — will appear in the regret
of the Auditor which can be bounded by the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality. We will therefore
have to assume that m0 is sufficiently large to make the above regret bound small enough.
Assumption 3.1. For a given confidence parameter δ, inputs α and ν of Algorithm 2, we
suppose throughout this section that the number of fresh problems m0 used in each round of
Algorithm 2 satisfies m0 ě O
´
logpnT {δq
α2ν2
¯
, or equivalently m “ m0 ¨ T ě O
´
T logpnT {δq
α2ν2
¯
.
Following Lemma 3.1 and Assumption 3.1, we characterize the average plays pp, pγ, pλq output by
Algorithm 2 in the following lemma. Informally speaking, this lemma guarantees that neither
player would gain more than ν if they deviated from these proposed strategies output by the
algorithm. This is what we call a ν-approximate equilibrium of the game. The proof of the
lemma follows from the regret analysis of the Auditor and is fully presented in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.2 (Average Play Characterization). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. We have that under Assumption
3.1, for any set of individuals X, with probability at least 1´ δ over the labelings F , the average
plays pp, pγ, pλq output by Algorithm 2 forms a ν-approximate equilibrium of the game, i.e.,
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ď L´p, γ, pλ¯` ν for all p P ∆pHqm , γ P r0, 1s
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ě L pp, pγ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
We are now ready to present the main theorem of this subsection which takes the guarantees
provided in Lemma 3.2 and turns them into accuracy and fairness guarantees of the pair pp, pγq
using the specific form of the Lagrangian (6). The theorem will in fact show that the set
of randomized classifiers p achieves optimal accuracy up to O pνq and that it also satisfies
pO pαq , 0q-AIF notion of fairness, all with respect to the empirical distributions pP and pQ.
Theorem 3.3 (In-sample Accuracy and Fairness). Let 0 ă δ ă 1 and suppose Assumption 3.1
holds. Let pp, pγq be the output of Algorithm 2 and let pp, γq be any feasible pair of variables
for the empirical fair learning problem (4). We have that for any set of individuals X, with
probability at least 1´ δ over the labelings F ,
err
´p; pP, pQ¯ ď err´p; pP, pQ¯` 2ν
and that p satisfies p3α, 0q-AIF with respect to the empirical distributions p pP, pQq. In other words,
for all i P rns, ˇˇˇ
E
´
xi, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ď 3α
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Figure 1: Illustration of generalization directions.
3.5 Generalization Theorems
When it comes to out-of-sample performance in our framework, unlike in usual learning settings,
there are two distributions we need to reason about: the individual distribution P and the
problem distribution Q (see Figure 1 for a visual illustration of generalization directions in our
framework). We need to argue that pψ induces a mapping that is accurate with respect to P and
Q, and is fair for almost every individual x „ P , where fairness is defined with respect to the true
problem distribution Q. Given these two directions for generalization, we state our generalization
guarantees in three steps visualized by arrows in Figure 1. First, in Theorem 3.4, we fix the
empirical distribution of the problems pQ and show that the output pψ of Algorithm 2 is accurate
and fair with respect to the underlying individual distribution P as long as n is sufficiently
large. Second, in Theorem 3.5, we fix the empirical distribution of individuals pP and consider
generalization along the underlying problem generating distribution Q. It will follow from the
dynamics of the algorithm, as well as the structure of pψ, that the learned mapping pψ will remain
accurate and fair with respect to Q. We will eventually put these pieces together in Theorem
3.6 and argue that pψ is accurate and fair with respect to the underlying distributions pP,Qq
simultaniously, given that both n and m are large enough. We will use OPT (see Definition 3.1)
as a benchmark to evaluate the accuracy of the mapping pψ.
Theorem 3.4 (Generalization over P). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let
´ pψ, pγ¯ be the outputs of Algorithm
2, and suppose
n ě rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
where dH is the VC dimension of H. We have that with probability at least 1 ´ 5δ over the
observed data set pX,F q, the mapping pψ satisfies p5α, βq-AIF with respect to the distributions´
P, pQ¯, i.e.,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 5α¯ ď β
and that,
err
´ pψ;P, pQ¯ ď OPT´α;P, pQ¯`O pνq `O pαβq
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The proof of this theorem will use standard VC-type generalization techniques where a Chernoff-
Hoeffding bound is followed by a union bound (accompanied with the two-sample trick and
Sauer’s Lemma) to guarantee a uniform convergence of the empirical estimates to their true
expectation. However, compared to the standard VC-based sample complexity bounds in learning
theory, there is an extra factor of m because there are m hypotheses to be learned and that the
α2 factor appears in the denominator since in our setting a uniform convergence for all – pure –
classifiers will not simply lead to a uniform convergence for all – randomized – classifiers without
blowing up the sample complexity (specifically when proving generalization for fairness). We will
therefore directly prove uniform convergence for randomized classifiers and that our argument
will go through by sparsifying the distributions p “ pψ|F (taking samples of size rO `1{α2˘ from p)
coupled with a uniform convergence for rO `1{α2˘-sparse classifiers (randomized classifiers with
support size ď rO `1{α2˘) and this is how α2 shows up in the sample complexity bound.
Theorem 3.5 (Generalization over Q). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let
´ pψ, pγ¯ be the outputs of Algorithm
2 and suppose
m ě rOˆ log pnq log pn{δq
ν4α4
˙
We have that for any set of observed individuals X, with probability at least 1 ´ 6δ over the
observed problems F , the learned mapping pψ satisfies p4α, 0q-AIF with respect to the distributions´ pP,Q¯, i.e.,
P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯ “ 0
and that,
err
´ pψ; pP,Q¯ ď OPT´α; pP,Q¯`O pνq
This theorem will follow directly from Chernoff-type concentration inequalities where the fact
that in each round the Auditor in our algorithm is using only a fresh batch of randomly selected
m0 problems to estimate the fairness violations will help us to prove concentration without
appealing to a uniform convergence. The sample complexity for m stated in this theorem is
equivalent to that of Assumption 3.1 because we needed almost the same type of concentration
for controlling the regret of the Auditor in the previous subsection. Having proved generalization
separately for P and Q, we are now ready to state the final theorem of this section which provides
generalization guarantees simultaneously over both distributions P and Q.
Theorem 3.6 (Simultaneous Generalization over P and Q). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let
´ pψ, pγ¯ be the
outputs of Algorithm 2 and suppose
n ě rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
, m ě rOˆ log pnq log pn{δq
ν4α4
˙
where dH is the VC dimension of H. We have that with probability at least 1 ´ 12δ over
the observed data set pX,F q, the learned mapping pψ satisfies p6α, 2βq-AIF with respect to the
distributions pP,Qq, i.e.,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 6α¯ ď 2β
and that,
err
´ pψ;P,Q¯ ď OPT pα;P,Qq `O pνq `O pαβq
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(a) convergence plot: communities data set (b) error spread plot: communities data set
Figure 2: (a) Error-unfairness trajectory plots illustrating the convergence of algorithm AIF-Learn. (b) Error-
unfairness tradeoffs and individual errors for AIF-Learn vs. simple mixtures of the error-optimal model and
random classification. Gray dots are shifted upwards slightly to avoid occlusions.
To prove this theorem we basically start with the guarantees we have for the empirical distributions
p pP, pQq and lift them into their corresponding guarantees for pP, pQq by Theorem 3.4. We will
then have to take another “lifting” step from pP, pQq to pP,Qq which is not quite similar to what
we have shown in Theorem 3.5 and will be proved as a separate lemma in the Appendix. Note
that the bounds on n and m in Theorem 3.6 are mutually dependent: n must be linear in m,
but m need only be logarithmic in n, and so both bounds can be simultaneously satisfied with
sample complexity that is only polynomial in the parameters of the problem.
4 Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented the AIF-Learn algorithm and conclude with a brief experimental demon-
stration of its practical efficacy using the Communities and Crime dataset3, which contains U.S.
census records with demographic information at the neighborhood level. To obtain a challenging
instance of our multi-problem framework, we treated each of the first n “ 200 neighborhoods as
the “individuals” in our sample, and binarized versions of the first m “ 50 variables as distinct
prediction problems. Another d “ 20 of the variables were used as features for learning. For
the base learning oracle assumed by AIF-Learn, we used a linear threshold learning heuristic
that has worked well in other oracle-efficient reductions ([Kearns et al., 2018]). To elaborate, we
build linear regression models for predicting the cost vectors C0 P Rn and C1 P Rn (where Cy is
the vector of costs for predicting y) and classify an individual according to the lowest predicted
cost by the regression models. We note that all results are reported in-sample, as our primary
interest here is not in generalization (which we addressed in the theory), but in the effectiveness
of our algorithm for the constrained optimization problem it is solving on the data, and how it
compares to a simple alternative.
3Described in detail and available for download at http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/communities+and+
crime
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Despite the absence of worst-case guarantees for the linear threshold heuristic, AIF-Learn seems
to empirically enjoy the strong convergence properties suggested by the theory. In Figure 2(a) we
show trajectory plots of the learned model’s error (x axis) versus its fairness violation (variation
in cross-problem individual error rates, y axis) over 1000 iterations of the algorithm for varying
values of the allowed fairness violation 2α (dashed horizontal lines). In each case we see the
trajectory eventually converge to a point which saturates the fairness constraint with the optimal
error.
In Figure 2(b) we provide a more detailed view of the behavior and performance of AIF-Learn.
The x axis measures error rates, while the y axis measures the allowed fairness violation. For
each value of the allowed fairness violation 2α (which is the allowed gap between the smallest
and largest individual errors on input α), there is a horizontal row of 200 blue dots showing the
error rates for each individual, and a single red dot representing the overall average of those
individual error rates. As expected, for large α (weak or no fairness constraint), the overall error
rate is lowest, but the spread of individual error rates (unfairness) is greatest. As α is decreased,
the spread of individual error rates is greatly narrowed, at a cost of greater overall error.
A trivial way of achieving zero variability in individual error rates is to make all predictions
randomly. So as a baseline comparison for AIF-Learn, the gray dots show the individual error
rates achieved by different mixtures of the unconstrained error-optimal model with random
classifications, with a black dot representing the overall average of these rates. When the weight
on random classification is low (weak or no fairness, top row of gray dots), the overall error is
lowest and the individual variation (unfairness) is highest. As we increase the weight on random
classification, variation or unfairness decreases and the overall error gets worse. It is clear from
the figure that AIF-Learn is considerably outperforming this baseline, both in terms of the
average errors (red vs. black lines) and the individual errors (blue vs. gray dots). Additional
experimental results are provided in the Appendix.
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Appendix
A Learning subject to False Positive AIF (FPAIF)
Definition A.1 (Individual False Positive/Negative Error Rates). For a given individual x P X ,
a mapping ψ P ∆pHqF , and distribution Q over the space of problems, the Individual false
positive/negative rate incurred by ψ on x are defined as follows:
EFP px, ψ;Qq “ 1P
f„Q rfpxq “ 0s
¨ E
f„Q
„
P
h„ψf
rhpxq “ 1, fpxq “ 0s

EFN px, ψ;Qq “ 1P
f„Q rfpxq “ 1s
¨ E
f„Q
„
P
h„ψf
rhpxq “ 0, fpxq “ 1s

Definition A.2 (FPAIF fairness notion). In our framework, we say a mapping ψ P ∆pHqF
satisfies “pα, βq-FPAIF” (reads pα, βq-approximate False Positive Average Individual Fairness)
with respect to the distributions pP,Qq if there exists γ ě 0 such that
P
x„P p|EFP px, ψ;Qq ´ γ| ą αq ď β
In this section we consider learning subject to the FPAIF notion of fairness. The FPAIF fairness
notion basically asks that the individual false positive rates be approximately (corresponds to α)
equalized across almost all (corresponds to β) individuals. Learning subject to equalizing false
negative rates can be developed similarly. We will be less wordy in this section as the ideas and
the approach that we take are mostly similar to those developed in Section 3. We start off by
casting the fair learning problem as the constrained optimization problem (10) where a mapping
ψ is to be found such that all individual false positive rates incurred by ψ are within α of some
γ. As before, we denote the optimal error of the optimization problem (10) by OPT and will
consider that as a benchmark to evaluate the accuracy of our algorithm’s trained mapping.
Fair Learning Problem subject to (α, 0)-FPAIF
min
ψ P∆pHqF , γ P r0,1s
err pψ;P,Qq
s.t. @x P X : |EFP px, ψ;Qq ´ γ| ď α
(10)
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Definition A.3. Consider the optimization problem (10). Given distributions P and Q and
fairness approximation parameter α, we denote the optimal solutions of (10) by ψ‹ pα;P,Qq and
γ‹ pα;P,Qq, and the value of the objective function at these optimal points by OPT pα;P,Qq. In
other words
OPT pα;P,Qq “ err pψ‹;P,Qq
It is important to observe that the optimization problem (10) has a nonempty set of feasible
points for any α and any distributions P and Q because the following is always feasible: γ “ 0
and ψf “ h0 for all f P F where h0 is the all-zero constant classifier. Since the distributions
P and Q are generally not known, we instead solve the empirical version of (10). Consider a
training data set consisting of n individuals X “ txiuni“1 drawn independently from P and m
problems F “ tfjumj“1 drawn independently from Q. We formulate the empirical fair learning
problem in (11) where we find an optimal fair mapping of the training problems F to ∆pHq
given the individuals X.
Empirical Fair Learning Problem
min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
err
´
p; pP, pQ¯
s.t. @i P t1, . . . , nu:
ˇˇˇ
EFP
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ď 2α (11)
As also discussed in Section 3, solving the empirical problem (11) will only give us a – restricted
– mapping p “ ψ|F by which we mean we learn ψ only on the finite domain F Ď F . It is not
clear for now how we can extend the restricted mapping ψ|F P ∆pHqm to a mapping ψ P ∆pHqF
defined over the entire function space F ; however, we will see the specific form of our algorithm
(as in the AIF setting: learning a set of weights over the training individuals) will allow us to
come up with such an extension.
We use the dual perspective of constrained optimization problems followed by no regret dynamics
to reduce (11) to a two-player zero-sum game between a Learner (primal player) and an Auditor
(dual player), and design an iterative algorithm to get an approximate equilibrium of the game.
To do so, we first rewrite the constraints of (11) in rFP
´
p, γ; pQ¯ ď 0 form where
rFP
´
p, γ; pQ¯ “
»–EFP ´xi,p; pQ¯´ γ ´ 2α
γ ´ EFP
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ 2α
fifln
i“1
P R2n (12)
represents the “fairness violations” of the pair pp, γq in one single vector. Let the corresponding
dual variables be represented by λ “ “λ`i ,λ´i ‰ni“1 P Λ, where Λ “ tλ P R2n` | ||λ||1 ď Bu. Using
Equation (12) and the introduced dual variables, we have that the Lagrangian of (11) is
L pp, γ,λq “ err
´
p; pP, pQ¯` λTrFP ´p, γ; pQ¯ (13)
Therefore, we focus on solving the following minmax problem:
min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
max
λPΛ L pp, γ,λq “ maxλPΛ minp P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s L pp, γ,λq (14)
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Using no regret dynamics, an approximate equilibrium of this zero-sum game (i.e. a saddle
point of L) can be found in an iterative framework. In each iteration, we let the dual player
run the exponentiated gradient descent algorithm and the primal player run an approximate
version of her best response using the oracle CSCpHq that solves cost sensitive classification
problems in H (see Definition 2.3). In the following subsection, we will first describe the best
response problem of the Learner, and show how the best response depends on the estimatespρ “ rpρisni“1 P Rn – where pρi is the fraction of problems in F that maps xi to 0 – in addition to
the weights w “ “λ`i ´ λ´i ‰ P Rn maintained by the Auditor. We will then argue that to avoid
injecting correlation into the algorithm (so as to argue later on about generalization) we have to
“perturb” the best response of the Learner by using some other set of estimates rρ “ rrρisni“1 which
is given to the algorithm and is independent of F . This is why the Learner is basically using an
approximate version of her best response.
Definition A.4. For an individual x P X , let ρx and pρx represent the probability that x is
labelled 0 by a randomly sampled function f „ Q and f „ pQ, respectively. In other words
ρx “ P
f„Q rfpxq “ 0s , pρx “ Pf„ pQ rfpxq “ 0s
we will use ρi ” ρxi and pρi ” pρxi to denote the corresponding probabilities for xi in the training
set of individuals X.
Remark A.1. Observe that using the introduced notation, for a mapping ψ and x P X ,
EFP px, ψ;Qq “
ˆ
1
ρx
˙
E
f„Q
„
P
h„ψf
rhpxq “ 1, fpxq “ 0s

EFN px, ψ;Qq “
ˆ
1
1´ ρx
˙
E
f„Q
„
P
h„ψf
rhpxq “ 0, fpxq “ 1s

and that E px, ψ;Qq can be written as a linear combination of EFP px, ψ;Qq and EFN px, ψ;Qq:
E px, ψ;Qq “ ρx ¨ EFP px, ψ;Qq ` p1´ ρxq ¨ EFN px, ψ;Qq
A.1 aBESTFP: The Learner’s approximate Best Response
In each iteration of the algorithm, the Learner is given some λ of the dual player and she wants
to solve the following minimization problem.
arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
L pp, γ,λq
” arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
err
´
p; pP, pQ¯` nÿ
i“1
!
λ`i
´
EFP
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ γ¯` λ´i ´γ ´ EFP ´xi,p; pQ¯¯)
” arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
1
n
nÿ
i“1
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯` nÿ
i“1
!
λ`i
´
EFP
´
xi,p; pQ¯´ γ¯` λ´i ´γ ´ EFP ´xi;p; pQ¯¯)
Let pρi be defined as in Definition A.4. We have that by Remark A.1
E
´
xi,p; pQ¯ “ pρi ¨ EFP ´xi,p; pQ¯` p1´ pρiq ¨ EFN ´xi,p; pQ¯
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Now let wi “ λ`i ´ λ´i for all i (Accordingly let w “ rw1, . . . , wnsJ P Rn). We have that the
above minimization problem is equivalent to
” arg min
p P∆pHqm, γ P r0,1s
´γ
nÿ
i“1
wi `
nÿ
i“1
"ˆpρi
n
` wi
˙
EFP
´
xi,p; pQ¯` ˆ1´ pρi
n
˙
EFN
´
xi,p; pQ¯*
Now we can use the fact that
EFP
´
xi,p; pQ¯ “ 1
mpρi
mÿ
j“1
P
hj„ pj
rhjpxiq “ 1, fjpxiq “ 0s
EFN
´
xi,p; pQ¯ “ 1
mp1´ pρiq
mÿ
j“1
P
hj„ pj
rhjpxiq “ 0, fjpxiq “ 1s
to conclude that the best response of the Learner is equivalent to minimizing the following
function over the space of pp, γq P ∆pHqm ˆ r0, 1s.
´ γ
nÿ
i“1
wi
` 1
m
mÿ
j“1
#
nÿ
i“1
ˆ
1
n
` wipρi
˙
P
hj„ pj
rhjpxiq “ 1, fjpxiq “ 0s `
ˆ
1
n
˙
P
hj„ pj
rhjpxiq “ 0, fjpxiq “ 1s
+
Therefore, as in the AIF setting, the minimization problem of the Learner gets nicely decoupled
into pm` 1q disjoint minimization problems. First, the optimal value for γ is chosen according to
γ “ 1
«
nÿ
i“1
wi ą 0
ff
(15)
and that for learning problem j, the following cost sensitive classification problem must be solved.
hj “ arg min
hPH
nÿ
i“1
 
c1i,j hpxiq ` c0i,j p1´ hpxiqq
(
(16)
where the costs are
c1i,j “
ˆ
1
n
` wipρi
˙
p1´ fjpxiqq , c0i,j “
ˆ
1
n
˙
fjpxiq
One major distinction between the Learner’s best response in the FPAIF setting versus that of
the AIF setting is that the empirical quantities tpρiuni“1 (which is estimated using the data set
F ) appear in the costs of the CSC problems for the FPAIF setting. As a major consequence,
the generalization (with respect to Q) arguments we had in the AIF setting won’t work in this
section because now the labels tfjpxiqui,j and the estimates tpρiuni“1 are correlated. We therefore
assume in this section that each individual xi P X comes with an estimate rρi of the rate ρi
that is independent of the data set F . More precisely stated, we assume our algorithm has
access to estimates trρiuni“1 such that for all i P rns, |rρi ´ ρi| ďalog pnq {2m0 where m0 (will be
specified exactly in our proposed algorithm) will be essentially the number of fresh problems
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that the Auditor is using in each round of the Algorithm. In fact, similar to what we did for
the AIF setting, we will randomly partition F into T batch of size m0: F “ tFtuTt“1 and will
let the Auditor to use only Ft at round t P rT s of the algorithm to update the vector of fairness
violations rFP. Notice assuming access to the estimates trρiuni“1 is not farfetched because we
can assume there was one more batch of m0 problems, say F0, and that the quantities trρiuni“1
were estimated using the batch F0 which is independent of F “ tFtuTt“1. The upper bound we
required for the difference |rρi ´ ρi| will just simply follow from a Chernoff-Hoeffding’s bound.
Assumption A.1. For m0 specified later on, we assume in this section that our algorithm has
access to quantities trρiuni“1, where we have that for all i P rns: |rρi ´ ρi| ďb logpnq2m0 .
Under Assumption A.1, we now modify the best response of the Learner and let it use the
estimates trρiuni“1 instead of tpρiuni“1. This will consequently make the learner to accumulate
regret over the course of the algorithm and that this is why we will call it the approximate
best response of the Learner. We have the approximate best response of the Learner (called
aBESTFP) written in Subroutine 4.
Subroutine 4: aBESTFP – approximate best response of the Learner in the FPAIF setting
Input: dual weights w P Rn, estimates rρ P Rn, training examples S “  xi, pfjpxiqqmj“1 (ni“1
γ Ð 1 rřni“1wi ą 0s
for j “ 1, . . . ,m do
c1i Ð pwi{rρi ` 1{nqp1´ fjpxiqq for i P rns
c0i Ð p1{nqfjpxiq for i P rns
D Ð txi, c1i , c0i uni“1
hj Ð CSC pH;Dq
end
hÐ ph1, h2, . . . , hmq
Output:
´
h, γ
¯
A.2 FPAIF-Learn: Implementation and In-sample Guarantees
We implement the introduced game theoretic framework in Algorithm 5 and call it FPAIF-
Learn. The overall style of the algorithm is similar to AIF-Learn (Algorithm 2) except that
FPAIF-Learn takes a set of estimates rρ P Rn as input and that rρ is used in the approximate
best response of the Learner. Once again, in the service of arguing for generalization, we split
F into T batches of size m0 uniformly at random and let the Auditor use only a fresh batch of
m0 problems in each round of the algorithm to update the dual variables λ, and accordingly
the weights w over the individuals. This is reflected in the algorithm by writing pQt “ UpFtq for
the uniform distribution over Ft and ht|Ft for the corresponding learned classifiers of Ft. The
algorithm will terminate after T “ O `log pnq {pν2α2q˘ iterations and output the average plays
of the Learner and the Auditor, along with a mapping pψ “ pψ pX, rρ,xW q P ∆pHqF which is the
object we wanted to learn. In fact, pψ extends the learned restricted mapping p “ pψ|F of the
algorithm from the finite domain F to the entire space F . We have the pseudocode for the
mapping pψ written in detail in Mapping 6.
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Algorithm 5: FPAIF-Learn – learning subject to FPAIF
Input: fairness parameter α, approximation parameter ν,
estimates rρ “ rrρisni“1,
training data set X “ txiuni“1 and F “ tfjumj“1
B Ð 1`2να , T Ð 16B
2p1`2αq2 logp2n`1q
ν2
, η Ð ν
4p1`2αq2B , m0 Ð mT , S Ð
!
xi, pfjpxiqqmj“1
)n
i“1
Partition F uniformly at random: F “ tFtuTt“1 where |Ft| “ m0.
θ1 Ð 0 P R2n
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
λ‚i,t Ð B exppθ
‚
i,tq
1`ři1,‚1 exppθ‚1i1,tq for i P rns and ‚ P t`,´u
wt Ð rλ`i,t ´ λ´i,tsni“1 P Rn
pht, γtq Ð aBESTFPpwt; rρ, Sq
θt`1 Ð θt ` η ¨ rFP
´
ht|Ft , γt; pQt¯
endp Ð 1T řTt“1 ht , pγ Ð 1T řTt“1 γt , pλÐ 1T řTt“1 λt , xW Ð twtuTt“1
Output: average plays
´p, pγ, pλ¯, mapping pψ “ pψ ´X, rρ,xW¯ (see Mapping 6)
The analysis of Algorithm 5 follows the same style and uses the same ideas as in the AIF learning
section. We will start by establishing the regret bounds for the Learner and the Auditor in
Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, respectively, and will show just as before how these regret bounds
can be eventually turned into in-sample accuracy and fairness guarantees. One major distinction
is that when working with false positive rates, the quantities ρx, pρx, rρx introduced before will
show up in the algorithm’s analysis. Define for the training individuals X “ txiuni“1
ρmin “ min
iPrns
ρi , pρmin “ min
iPrns
pρi , rρmin “ min
iPrns
rρi
We will in fact see rρmin and pρmin will appear in the regret bounds of the Learner and that of the
Auditor, respectively.
Mapping 6: pψ pX, rρ,xW q – pseudocode for the mapping pψ output by Algorithm 5
Input: f P F (represented to pψ as tfpxiquni“1)
for t “ 1, . . . , T do
c1i Ð pwi,t{rρi ` 1{nqp1´ fpxiqq for i P rns
c0i Ð p1{nqfpxiq for i P rns
D Ð txi, c1i , c0i uni“1
hf,wt Ð CSC pH;Dq
endpψf Ð 1T řTt“1 hf,wt
Output: pψf P ∆pHq
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Lemma A.1 (Regret of the Learner). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let tht, γtuTt“1 be the sequence of
approximate best response plays by the Learner to the given tλtuTt“1 of the Auditor over T rounds
of Algorithm 5. We have that for any set of individuals X, with probability at least 1´ δ{2 over
the problems F , the (average) regret of the Learner is bounded as follows:
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
´ 1
T
min
p P∆pHqm, γ Pr0,1s
Tÿ
t“1
L pp, γ,λtq ď 4Brρmin
d
log p8nT {δq
2m0
Lemma A.2 (Regret of the Auditor). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let tλtuTt“1 be the sequence of exponentiated
gradient descent plays (with learning rate η) by the Auditor to the given tht, γtuTt“1 of the Learner
over T rounds of Algorithm 5. We have that for any set of individuals X, with probability at
least 1´ δ{2 over the problems F , the (average) regret of the Auditor is bounded as follows: For
any λ P Λ,
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λ
¯
´ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
ď 2Bpρmin
d
log p8nT {δq
2m0
` B log p2n` 1q
ηT
` ηB p1` 2αq2
Observe that in order to control the regret of the Learner and the Auditor at level Opνq we need
to assume that m0 is large enough such that the regret bound of the Learner and the first term
appearing in the regret bound of the Auditor are sufficiently small.
Assumption A.2. For a given confidence parameter δ, inputs α and ν of Algorithm 5, we
assume throughout this section that the number of fresh problems m0 used in each round of
Algorithm 5 satisfies m0 ě O
´
logpnT {δq
α2ν2ρ2min
¯
, or equivalently m “ m0 ¨ T ě O
´
T logpnT {δq
α2ν2ρ2min
¯
.
Note that Assumption A.2 immediately implies via a Chernoff bound that pρmin ě ρmin{2 and that
it also implies via Assumption A.1 that rρmin ě ρmin{2. In the following lemma we characterize
the average play of the Learner and the Auditor. The proof of this lemma follows from the regret
bounds developed in Lemma A.1 (Regret of the Learner) and Lemma A.2 (Regret of the Auditor)
and uses exactly the same techniques as in the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Lemma A.3 (Average Play Characterization). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let
´p, pγ, pλ¯ be the average plays
output by Algorithm 5. We have that under Assumption A.2, for any set of observed individuals
X, with probability at least 1´ δ over the observed labelings F , the average plays
´p, pγ, pλ¯ forms
a ν-approximate equilibrium of the game, i.e.,
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ď L´p, γ, pλ¯` ν for all p P ∆pHqm , γ P r0, 1s
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ě L pp, pγ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
We conclude this subsection with our main Theorem A.4 that provides in-sample accuracy and
fairness guarantees for the learned set of classifiers p P ∆pHqm of Algorithm 5. This theorem
follows immediately from Lemma A.3 and the proof is pretty much similar in style to the proof
of Theorem 3.3.
25
Theorem A.4 (In-sample Accuracy and Fairness). Let 0 ă δ ă 1 and suppose Assumption A.2
holds. Let pp, pγq be the output of Algorithm 5 and let pp, γq be any feasible pair of variables
for the empirical fair learning problem (11). We have that for any set of individuals X, with
probability at least 1´ δ over the labelings F ,
err
´p; pP, pQ¯ ď err´p; pP, pQ¯` 2ν
and that p satisfies p3α, 0q-FPAIF with respect to p pP, pQq. In other words, for all i P rns,ˇˇˇ
EFP
´
xi, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ď 3α
A.3 Generalization Theorems
We now consider the mapping pψ learned by Algorithm 5 and study the generalization bounds
both for accuracy and fairness. As in the AIF learning setting, we state our generalization
theorems in three steps. We first consider in Theorem A.5 the empirical distribution of the
problems pQ and see how we can lift the guarantees from pP into the true underlying distribution of
individuals P . We will then consider generalization only over the problem generating distribution
Q in Theorem A.6. We will eventually in Theorem A.7 provide accuracy and fairness guarantees
for the learned mapping pψ with respect to the distributions pP,Qq. We will use OPT (defined
formally in Definition A.3) as a benchmark to evaluate the accuracy of the mapping pψ. Proofs of
these theorems are similar to their counterparts in the AIF section.
Theorem A.5 (Generalization over P). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let
´ pψ, pγ¯ be the outputs of Algorithm
5, and suppose
n ě rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
where dH is the VC dimension of H. We have that with probability at least 1 ´ 5δ over the
observed data set pX,F q, the mapping pψ satisfies p5α, βq-FPAIF with respect to ´P, pQ¯, i.e.,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
EFP
´
x, pψ; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 5α¯ ď β
and that,
err
´ pψ;P, pQ¯ ď OPT´α;P, pQ¯`O pνq `O pαβq
Theorem A.6 (Generalization over Q). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let
´ pψ, pγ¯ be the outputs of Algorithm
5 and suppose
m ě rOˆ log pnq log pn{δq
ρ2minν
4α4
˙
where ρmin “ miniPrns ρi. We have that for any set of observed individuals X, with probability at
least 1´ 6δ over the observed problems F , pψ satisfies p4α, 0q-FPAIF with respect to ´ pP,Q¯, i.e.,
P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
EFP
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯ “ 0
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and that,
err
´ pψ; pP,Q¯ ď OPT´α; pP,Q¯`O pνq
Theorem A.7 (Simultaneous Generalization over P and Q). Let 0 ă δ ă 1. Let
´ pψ, pγ¯ be the
outputs of Algorithm 5 and suppose
n ě rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
, m ě rO˜ log pnq log pn{δq
ρ2inf ν
4α4
¸
where dH is the VC dimension of H and ρinf “ infxPX ρx. We have that with probability at least
1´ 12δ over the observed data set pX,F q, the learned mapping pψ satisfies p6α, 2βq-FPAIF with
respect to the distributions pP,Qq, i.e.,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
EFP
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 6α¯ ď 2β
and that,
err
´ pψ;P,Q¯ ď OPT pα;P,Qq `O pνq `O pαβq
B Proofs of Section 3
B.1 Preliminary Tools
Theorem B.1 (Additive Chernoff-Hoeffding Bound). Let X “ tXiuni“1 be a sequence of i.i.d.
random variables with a ď Xi ď b and E rXis “ µ for all i. We have that for all s ą 0,
PX
„ˇˇˇˇř
iXi
n
´ µ
ˇˇˇˇ
ě s

ď 2 exp
ˆ ´2ns2
pb´ aq2
˙
Lemma B.2 (Sauer’s Lemma (see e.g. [Kearns and Vazirani, 1994])). Let H be a class of binary
functions defined on X where the VC dimension of H, dH, is finite. Let X “ txiuni“1 be a data
set of size n drwan from X and let HpXq “ tphpx1q, . . . , hpxnqq : h P Hu be the set of induced
labelings of H on X. We have that |HpXq| ď O `ndH˘.
Theorem B.3 (Exponentiated Gradient Descent Regret (see corollary 2.14 of [Shalev-Shwartz,
2012])). Let Λ1 “  λ1 P Rd` : ||λ1||1 “ B(. Suppose the exponentiated gradient descent algorithm
with learning rate η is run on the sequence of linear functions
 
ftpλ1q “ pλ1qJrt
(T
t“1 where λ
1 P Λ1
and ||rt||8 ď L for all t. Let λ1t denote the exponentiated gradient descent play at round t. We
have that the regret of the algorithm over T rounds is:
RegretT pΛ1q “ max
λ1PΛ1
Tÿ
t“1
pλ1qJ rt ´
Tÿ
t“1
pλ1tqJ rt ď B log pdqη ` ηBL
2T
and that for η “ O `1{?T ˘, we have that RegretT pΛ1q “ O `?T ˘.
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B.2 Algorithm Analysis and In-sample Guarantees
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Fix the set of observed individuals X P X n. Recall that Λ “ tλ P R2n` :
||λ||1 ď Bu is the set of strategies for the Auditor. Now let Λ1 “ tλ1 P R2n`1` : ||λ1||1 “ Bu. Any
λ P Λ is associated with a λ1 P Λ1 which is equal to λ on the first 2n coordinates and has the
remaining mass on the last one. Let prt “ r ´ht|Ft , γt; pQt¯ be the vector of fairness violations –
estimated over only the m0 problems Ft of round t – that the Auditor is using in Algorithm 2,
and let pr1t P R2n`1 be equal to prt on the first 2n coordinates and zero in the last one. We have
that for any λ P Λ and its associated λ1 P Λ1, and in particular for λt and λ1t of Algorithm 2,
and all t P rT s,
λJ prt “ pλ1qJ pr1t , λJt prt “ pλ1tqJ pr1t (17)
Now by Theorem B.3, and using the observation that ||pr1t||8 “ ||prt||8 ď 1` 2α, we have that
for any λ1 P Λ1,
Tÿ
t“1
pλ1qJ pr1t ď Tÿ
t“1
pλ1tqJ pr1t ` B log p2n` 1qη ` η p1` 2αq2BT
Consequently by Equation (17), we have that for any λ P Λ,
Tÿ
t“1
λJ prt ď Tÿ
t“1
λJt prt ` B log p2n` 1qη ` η p1` 2αq2BT
Now let rt “ r
´
ht, γt; pQ¯ be the vector of fairness violations estimated over all problems F and
notice that the regret bound must be with respect to rt and not prt. With that goal in mind, we
have that for any λ P Λ,
Tÿ
t“1
λJ rt ď
Tÿ
t“1
λJt rt `
Tÿ
t“1
pλt ´ λqJ pprt ´ rtq ` B log p2n` 1q
η
` η p1` 2αq2BT
We will use Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality to bound the difference pprt ´ rtq in `8 norm. Letpψt “ pψ pX,wtq (see Mapping 3) where wt is the vector of weights used in round t of the algorithm
and observe that we can rewrite prt and rt in terms of pψt:
prt “
»–E ´xi, pψt; pQt¯´ γt ´ 2α
γt ´ E
´
xi, pψt; pQt¯´ 2α
fifln
i“1
, rt “
»–E ´xi, pψt; pQ¯´ γt ´ 2α
γt ´ E
´
xi, pψt; pQ¯´ 2α
fifln
i“1
Hence, bounding the difference pprt ´ rtq in `8 norm involves bounding the termsˇˇˇ
E
´
xi, pψt; pQt¯´ E ´xi, pψt; pQ¯ˇˇˇ
for all i. Notice we can now view the batch of problems Ft as independent draws from the
distribution pQ. Therefore, it follows from the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s Theorem B.1 that with
probability at least 1´ δ over the set of problems F , for any λ P Λ,
Tÿ
t“1
pλt ´ λqJ pprt ´ rtq ď Tÿ
t“1
||λt ´ λ||1 ¨ ||prt ´ rt||8 ď B Tÿ
t“1
||prt ´ rt||8 ď BT
d
log p2nT {δq
2m0
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which implies with probability at least 1´ δ over the problems F , for any λ P Λ,
1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λ
¯
´ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
ď B
d
log p2nT {δq
2m0
` B log p2n` 1q
ηT
` η p1` 2αq2B
completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let
Rλ :“ B
d
log p2nT {δq
2m0
` B log p2n` 1q
ηT
` η p1` 2αq2B
be the average regret of the Auditor. We have that for any p P ∆pHqm and γ P r0, 1s,
L
´
p, γ, pλ¯ “ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L pp, γ,λtq (by linearity of Lq
ě 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
ppht, γtq is Learner’s Best Responseq
ě 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt, pλ¯´Rλ pw.p. 1´ δ over F by Lemma 3.1q
“ L
´p, pγ, pλ¯´Rλ
And that for any λ P Λ we have:
L pp, pγ,λq “ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λ
¯
(by linearity of Lq
ď 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
`Rλ pw.p. 1´ δ over F by Lemma 3.1q
ď 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
L pp, pγ,λtq `Rλ ppht, γtq is Learner’s Best Responseq
“ L
´p, pγ, pλ¯`Rλ
Now we have to pick T and η of Algorithm 2 such that Rλ ď ν where ν is the approximation
parameter input to the algorithm. First let B “ 1`2να and observe that if m0 ě 2B
2 logp2nT {δq
ν2
“
2p1`2νq2 logp2nT {δq
ν2α2
(see Assumption 3.1 on m0) we have that
Rλ ď ν
2
` B log p2n` 1q
ηT
` η p1` 2αq2B
Next, let T “ 16B2p1`2αq2 logp2n`1q
ν2
, and η “ ν
4p1`2αq2B which makes the last two terms appearing
in the RHS of the inequality to sum to ν{2, and accordingly Rλ ď ν. Therefore, we have shown
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that for any X, with probability at least 1´ δ over the observed labelings F ,
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ď L´p, γ, pλ¯` ν for all p P ∆pHqm , γ P r0, 1s
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ě L pp, pγ,λq ´ ν for all λ P Λ
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let pp, γq be any feasible point of the constrained optimization problem
(4) (note as discussed in the body of the paper there is at least one) and define λ‹ P Λ to be
λ‹ :“
$&%0 if rk‹
´p, pγ; pQ¯ ď 0
Bek‹ if rk‹
´p, pγ; pQ¯ ą 0
where k‹ “ arg max1ďkď2n rk
´p, pγ; pQ¯. Observe that with probability 1´ δ over F ,
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ď L´p, γ, pλ¯` ν pby Lemma 3.2q
“ err
´
p; pP, pQ¯` pλJr ´p, γ; pQ¯` ν
ď err
´
p; pP, pQ¯` ν
and that,
L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ ě L pp, pγ,λ‹q ´ ν pby Lemma 3.2q
“ err
´p; pP, pQ¯` pλ‹qJr ´p, pγ; pQ¯´ ν
ě err
´p; pP, pQ¯´ ν
Combining the above upper and lower bounds on L
´p, pγ, pλ¯ implies
err
´p; pP, pQ¯ ď err´p; pP, pQ¯` 2ν
Now let’s prove the bound on fairness violation. Once again using the above upper and lower
bounds, we have that
pλ‹qJr
´p, pγ; pQ¯ ď err´p; pP, pQ¯´ err´p; pP, pQ¯` 2ν ď 1` 2ν
By definition of λ‹,
max
1ďkď2n rk
´p, pγ; pQ¯ ď 1` 2ν
B
which implies for all 1 ď i ď n, ˇˇˇ
E
´
xi, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ď 2α` 1` 2ν
B
And the proof is completed by the choice of B “ p1` 2νq {α in Algorithm 2.
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B.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4: Generalization over P
When arguing about generalization over the distribution P, we will have to come up with a
uniform convergence for all randomized classifiers. It is usually the case in learning theory – for
example when considering the concentration of classifiers’ errors – that a uniform convergence for
pure classifiers will immediately imply the uniform convergence for randomized classifiers without
blowing up the sample complexity. However, in our setting and in particular for our notion of
fairness, we will have to directly argue about the uniform convergence of randomized classifiers.
Although there are possibly infinitely many of those randomized classifiers, we actually need to
consider only the rO `1{α2˘-sparse classifiers by which we mean the distributions over H with
support of size at most rO `1{α2˘. This 1{α2 factor will accordingly show up in our final sample
complexity bound for n.
Definition B.1 (Sparse Randomized Classifiers). We say a randomized classifier p P ∆ pHq is
r-sparse if the support of p is of size at most r. We denote the set of all r-sparse randomized
classifiers of the hypothesis class H by ∆rpHq, and the elements of ∆rpHq by pprq.
Lemma B.4 (Uniform Convergence of AIF Fairness Notion in ∆rpHqm). Let 0 ă δ ă 1 and
r P N and let T be the number of iterations in Algorithm 2. Suppose
n ě rOˆrmdH ` log pT {δq
β2
˙
We have that for any set of problems F , with probability at least 1´ δ over the individuals X:
for all pprq P ∆rpHqm and all γ P
 
0, 1T ,
2
T , . . . , 1
(
,ˇˇˇˇ
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x,pprq; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ą α¯´ P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x,pprq; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ą α¯ˇˇˇˇ ď β
Proof of Lemma B.4. The proof of this Lemma will use standard techniques for proving uniform
convergence in learning theory such as the “two-sample trick” and Sauer’s Lemma B.2. To
simplify notation, let’s call, for any pprq P ∆rpHqm and any γ P ST :“
 
0, 1T ,
2
T , . . . , 1
(
,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x,pprq; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ą α¯ :“ g ´pprq, γ;P¯ (18)
Define event A pXq as follows:
A pXq “
!
Dpprq P ∆rpHqm, γ P ST :
ˇˇˇ
g
´
pprq, γ;P
¯
´ g
´
pprq, γ; pPX¯ˇˇˇ ą β)
where pPX ” pP represents the uniform distribution over X. Our ultimate goal is to show that
given the sample complexity for n stated in the lemma, PX rA pXqs is small. Suppose besides
the original data set X, we also have an “imaginary” data set of individuals X 1 “ tx1iuni“1 P X n
sampled i.i.d. from the distribution P. Define event B pX,X 1q as follows:
B
`
X,X 1
˘ “ "Dpprq P ∆rpHqm, γ P ST : ˇˇˇg ´pprq, γ; pPX 1¯´ g ´pprq, γ; pPX¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2
*
Claim: PX rA pXqs ď 2PpX,X 1q rB pX,X 1qs. Proof: It suffices to show that
PpX,X 1q
“
BpX,X 1q |ApXq‰ ě 1{2
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because
PpX,X 1q
“
B
`
X,X 1
˘‰ ě PpX,X 1q “BpX,X 1q |ApXq‰ PX rA pXqs
Let the event ApXq hold and suppose the pair pprq‹ and γ‹ satisfyˇˇˇ
g
´
p
prq‹ , γ‹;P
¯
´ g
´
p
prq‹ , γ‹; pPX¯ˇˇˇ ą β
We have that by the triangle inequality and a Chernoff-Hoeffding’s bound:
PpX,X 1q
“
BpX,X 1q |ApXq‰
ě PpX,X 1q
„ˇˇˇ
g
´
p
prq‹ , γ‹; pPX 1¯´ g ´pprq‹ , γ‹; pPX¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2

ě PpX,X 1q
„ˇˇˇ
g
´
p
prq‹ , γ‹;P
¯
´ g
´
p
prq‹ , γ‹; pPX¯ˇˇˇ´ ˇˇˇg ´pprq‹ , γ‹;P¯´ g ´pprq‹ , γ‹; pPX 1¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2

ě PX 1
„ˇˇˇ
g
´
p
prq‹ , γ‹;P
¯
´ g
´
p
prq‹ , γ‹; pPX 1¯ˇˇˇ ă β
2

ě 1´ 2e´nβ
2
2
ě 1{2
Following the claim, it now suffices to show that PpX,X 1q rBpX,X 1qs is small. Consider the
following thought experiment: Let T and T 1 be two empty sets. For each i P rns toss a fair coin
independently and
• if it lands on Heads, put xi in T and x1i in T 1.
• if it lands on Tails, put x1i in T and xi in T 1.
We will later denote the randomness induced by these coin flips by “coin” in our probability
statements. It follows immediately by our construction that the distribution of pT, T 1q is the
same as the distribution of pX,X 1q, and therefore
PpX,X 1q
“
BpX,X 1q‰ “ PpT,T 1q “BpT, T 1q‰ “ PpX,X 1,coinq “BpT, T 1q‰ (19)
where
BpT, T 1q “
"
Dpprq P ∆rpHqm, γ P ST :
ˇˇˇ
g
´
pprq, γ; pPT 1¯´ g ´pprq, γ; pPT¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2
*
But we have that
PpX,X 1,coinq
“
BpT, T 1q‰ “ EpX,X 1q “Pcoin “BpT, T 1q‰‰ (20)
where we use the fact that the coin flips are independent of the random variables pX,X 1q and
thus, conditioning on pX,X 1q won’t change the distribution of “coin”. Following Equations (19)
and (20), it now suffices to show that for – any pX,X 1q – Pcoin rBpT, T 1qs is small. Fix the data
sets pX,X 1q. Fix pprq P ∆rpHqm and γ P ST and let
I “
!
i P rns : g
´
pprq, γ;xi
¯
‰ g
´
pprq, γ;x1i
¯)
where recall that by Equation (18):
g
´
pprq, γ;xi
¯
“ 1
”ˇˇˇ
E
´
xi,p
prq; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ą αı
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Let |I| “ n1 ď n. Observe that
Pcoin
„ˇˇˇ
g
´
pprq, γ; pPT 1¯´ g ´pprq, γ; pPT¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2

“ Pcoin
„
|headspIq ´ tailspIq| ą nβ
2

where headspIq and tailspIq denote the number of heads and tails of the coin on indices I. But a
triangle inequality followed by two Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds imply
Pcoin
„
|headspIq ´ tailspIq| ą nβ
2

ď Pcoin
„ˇˇˇˇ
headspIq
n1 ´
1
2
ˇˇˇˇ
ą nβ
4n1

` Pcoin
„ˇˇˇˇ
1
2
´ tailspIq
n1
ˇˇˇˇ
ą nβ
4n1

ď 4e´2n1pnβ{4n1q2
ď 4e´nβ2{8
Therefore, we have proved that for any pprq P ∆rpHqm and any γ P ST ,
Pcoin
„ˇˇˇ
g
´
pprq, γ; pPT 1¯´ g ´pprq, γ; pPT¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2

ď 4e´nβ2{8
Now it’s time to apply Sauer’s Lemma B.2 to get a uniform convergence for all pprq P ∆rpHqm
and all γ P ST . Notice once the data sets pX,X 1q are fixed, there are at most O
´
p2nqdH rm
¯
number of randomized classifiers pprq P ∆rpHqm induced on the set tX,X 1u. Here 2n comes from
the fact that X and X 1 have a combined number of 2n points. dH is the VC dimension, and r
and m show up in the bound because each p
prq
j in p
prq is r-sparse and that there are a total of m
randomized classifiers p
prq
j in p
prq. We also have that |ST | “ T ` 1. Consequently by a union
bound over all induced pprq and all γ P ST :
Pcoin
“
BpT, T 1q‰ “ Pcoin „Dpprq P ∆rpHqm, γ P ST : ˇˇˇg ´pprq, γ; pPT 1¯´ g ´pprq, γ; pPT¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2

ď
ÿ
pprq,γ
Pcoin
„ˇˇˇ
g
´
pprq, γ; pPT 1¯´ g ´pprq, γ; pPT¯ˇˇˇ ą β
2

ď O
´
p2nqdH rm
¯
¨ pT ` 1q ¨ 4e´nβ2{8
where the second sum is actually over all the induced r-sparse randomized classifiers on the set
tX,X 1u and all γ P ST . This shows so long as
n ě rOˆrmdH ` log pT {δq
β2
˙
we have that for any pX,X 1q, Pcoin rBpT, T 1qs ď δ{2. Therefore
PX rApXqs ď 2PpX,X 1q
“
B
`
X,X 1
˘‰ “ 2EpX,X 1q “Pcoin “BpT, T 1q‰‰ ď δ
completing the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 3.4. We will use Lemma B.4 in the proof of this theorem. We are interested
in the fairness violation and accuracy of the mapping pψ “ pψ pX,F q returned by Algorithm 2
with respect to the distributions P and pQ. Fix the set of problems F and observe that when we
work with the empirical distribution of the problems pQ, we have that
E
´
x, pψ; pQ¯ “ E ´x, p; pQ¯ , err´ pψ;P, pQ¯ “ err´p;P, pQ¯
where p is the set of m randomized classifiers output by Algorithm 2. Let’s first prove the
generalization for fairness. Define event A pXq:
A pXq “
"
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 5α¯´ P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 3α¯ ą β*
We will eventually show that under the stated sample complexity for n in the theorem, PX rA pXqs
is small. Consider the distributions p “ pp1, p2, . . . , pmq over H. Let
r “ log p12nm{δq
2α2
For each j P rms, consider drawing r independent samples from the distribution pj and definepprqj to be the uniform distribution over the drawn samples. We will abuse notation and use pprqj
to denote both the drawn samples and the uniform distribution over them. Now define
pprq “ ´pprq1 , pprq2 , . . . , pprqm ¯ P ∆rpHqm
which is the “r-sparsified” version p. One important observation that follows from the Chernoff-
Hoeffding’s theorem is that for – any – X 1 “ tx1iuni“1 P X n, with probability at least 1´ δ{6 over
the draws of pprq, we have that for all i P rns:ˇˇˇ
E
´
x1i, p; pQ¯´ E ´x1i, pprq; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď α (21)
In other words, for any set of individuals X 1 P X n of size n, we have that:
Ppprq
„
P
x„ pP 1
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ E ´x, pprq; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ ‰ 0 ď δ{6 (22)
where pP 1 denotes the uniform distribution over X 1. Now define events B,C,D as follows:
B
´
X, pprq¯ “ "ˇˇˇˇ P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pprq; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯´ P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pprq; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯ˇˇˇˇ ą β
2
*
C
´
X, pprq¯ “ " P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ E ´x, pprq; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ ą β
2
*
D
´
X, pprq¯ “ " P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ E ´x, pprq; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ ‰ 0*
It follows by the triangle inequality that
PX rA pXqs “ PX,pprq rA pXqs
ď P
X,pprq
”
B
´
X, pprq¯ıloooooooooooomoooooooooooon
term 1
`P
X,pprq
”
C
´
X, pprq¯ıloooooooooooomoooooooooooon
term 2
`P
X,pprq
”
D
´
X, pprq¯ıloooooooooooomoooooooooooon
term 3
So to prove that PX rA pXqs is small, it suffices to show that all the three terms appearing in the
RHS of the above inequality are small. We will in fact show each term ď δ{3:
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• term 1: Notice to bound this term we need to prove a uniform convergence for all r-sparse
set of randomized classifiers pprq P ∆rpHqm and all γ of the form c{T for some nonnegative
integer c ď T (because the pγ output by our algorithm has this form). But we have already
proved this uniform convergence in Lemma B.4. In fact if we define the event:
B1pXq “
!
Dpprq P ∆rpHqm, γ P t0, 1
T
,
2
T
, . . . , 1u :ˇˇˇˇ
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x,pprq; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯´ P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x,pprq; pQ¯´ γ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯ˇˇˇˇ ą β
2
)
by Lemma B.4, so long as,
n ě rOˆrmdH ` log pT {δq
β2
˙
” rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
pRecall: T “ O `log pnq {ν2α2˘q
we have that PX rB1pXqs ď δ{3. And this implies
P
X,pprq
”
B
´
X, pprq¯ı ď PX rB1 pXqs ď δ{3
• term 2: Observe that
P
X,pprq
”
C
´
X, pprq¯ı “ EX ”Ppprq ”C ´X, pprq¯ıı
Notice when we condition on X, the conditional distribution of both p and pprq will actually
change because they both depend on X, but it is the case that for any X, pprq (given X)
will be still independent draws from p (given X) and this is what we actually need. We
will show for any X:
Ppprq
”
C
´
X, pprq¯ı ď δ{3
Fix X. Let X 1 “ tx1iuni“1 be a new data set of individuals drawn independently from the
distribution P and let pP 1 denote the uniform distribution over X 1. Define the events:
C1
´
X 1, pprq¯ “"ˇˇˇˇ
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ E ´x, pprq; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯´ P
x„ pP 1
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ E ´x, pprq; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ˇˇˇˇ ą β
2
*
C2
´
X 1, pprq¯ “ " P
x„ pP 1
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ E ´x, pprq; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ ‰ 0*
It follows by a triangle inequality that:
Ppprq
”
C
´
X, pprq¯ı “ P
X 1,pprq
”
C
´
X, pprq¯ı
ď P
X 1,pprq
”
C1
´
X 1, pprq¯ı` P
X 1,pprq
”
C2
´
X 1, pprq¯ı
“ Epprq
”
PX 1
”
C1
´
X 1, pprq¯ıı` EX 1 ”Ppprq ”C2 ´X 1, pprq¯ıı
Given pprq, we have by a Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality that as long as the sample
complexity for n is met:
PX 1
”
C1
´
X 1, pprq¯ı ď δ{6
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On the other hand, given X 1, it follows by Equation (22) that,
Ppprq
”
C2
´
X 1, pprq¯ı ď δ{6
Hence:
P
X,pprq
”
C
´
X, pprq¯ı ď δ{3
• term 3: Equation (22) implies:
P
X,pprq
”
D
´
X, pprq¯ı “ EX ”Ppprq ”D ´X, pprq¯ıı ď δ{3
We finally proved PX rA pXqs ď δ. In other words, we have proved that for any F , with probability
at least 1´ δ over the individuals X,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 5α¯´ P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 3α¯ ď β
On the other hand, the in-sample guarantees provided in Theorem 3.3 implies for any X, with
probability 1´ δ over the observed problems F , the pair pp, pγq of Algorithm 2 satisfies
P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 3α¯ “ 0
Hence, as long as
n ě rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
(23)
we have that with probability at least 1´ 2δ over the observed data set pX,F q,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, p; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 5α¯ ď β
which shows p, or equivalently the mapping pψ, satisfies p5α, βq-AIF with respect to the distribu-
tions P and pQ. Now let’s look at the generalization (with respect to P) error of p. Let
ψ‹ “ ψ‹
´
α;P, pQ¯ , γ‹ “ γ‹ ´α;P, pQ¯ , err´ψ‹;P, pQ¯ “ OPT´α;P, pQ¯
be defined as in Definition 3.1. Let also ψ‹|F “ p‹ P ∆pHqm. Since we are working with the
empirical distribution of problems pQ,
err
´
p‹;P, pQ¯ “ err´ψ‹;P, pQ¯ “ OPT´α;P, pQ¯
We would like to compare the accuracy of p with respect to the distributions P and pQ, i.e.
err
´p;P, pQ¯, to OPT´α;P, pQ¯ as a benchmark. We establish this comparison in three steps:
1. a bound on the difference between err
´p;P, pQ¯ and its in-sample version err´p; pP, pQ¯.
Note a uniform convergence can be achieved for all p P ∆pHqm by standard generalization
techniques (Sauer’s Lemma and the two-sample trick, as discussed in the proof of Lemma
B.4), without even needing to consider the uniform convergence for r-sparse randomized
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classifiers. Because when investigating the concentration of the overall error rate which is
in the form of nested expectations, the linearity of expectation helps us to directly turn
a uniform convergence for all sets of pure classifiers h P Hm into a uniform convergence
for all randomized classifiers p P ∆ pHqm without blowing up the sample complexity by a
factor of 1{α2. We can therefore guarantee that for all F , with probability at least 1´ δ
over X, as long as the sample complexity (23) is satisfied:ˇˇˇ
err
´p;P, pQ¯´ err´p; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď O pαβq (24)
2. a bound on the difference between err
´
p‹;P, pQ¯ and its in-sample version err´p‹; pP, pQ¯.
This is very simple and it follows immediately from the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s theorem that
for all F , with probability at least 1´ δ over X, as long as (23) is satisfied:ˇˇˇ
OPT
´
α;P, pQ¯´ err´p‹; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď O pαβq
3. the pair pp‹, γ‹q is feasible in the empirical learning problem (4). As a consequence,
Theorem 3.3 implies for any X, with probability 1´ δ over F :
err
´p; pP, pQ¯ ď err´p‹; pP, pQ¯` 2ν
Finally, putting together all three pieces explained above, we have that with probability at least
1´ 3δ over the observed data set pX,F q,
err
´p;P, pQ¯ ď OPT´α;P, pQ¯`O pνq `O pαβq
completing the proof.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 3.5: Generalization over Q
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Fix the set of observed individuals X “ txiuni“1 and recall pP denotes the
uniform distribution over X. Letpψ “ pψ ´X,xW¯ where xW “ twtuTt“1
be the mapping returned by Algorithm 2. We would like to lift the accuracy and fairness
guarantees of pψ from the empirical distribution pQ up to the true underlying distribution Q. First
observe that by the definition of pψ (Mapping 3), for any x P X and any distribution Q:
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯ “ 1
T
Tÿ
t“1
E
´
x, pψt;Q¯ (25)
where pψt “ pψ pX,wtq is a mapping defined only by the weights wt of round t over the individuals
X. pψt in fact takes a function f , solves one CSC problem on X weighted by wt and then returns
the learned classifier. For any t P rT s, we are interested in bounding the differenceˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψt;Q¯´ E ´x, pψt; pQ¯ˇˇˇ
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Notice following the dynamics of our algorithm, wt (and accordingly pψt) has dependence
on the batches of problems tFt1ut´1t1“1 and therefore we cannot directly invoke the Chernoff-
Hoeffding’s theorem to bound the above difference. We instead use the estimates Epx, pψt; pQtq
where pQt “ UpFtq as an intermediary step to bound the above difference. Observe that a simple
triangle inequality impliesˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψt;Q¯´ E ´x, pψt; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď ˇˇˇE ´x, pψt;Q¯´ E ´x, pψt; pQt¯ˇˇˇ` ˇˇˇE ´x, pψt; pQt¯´ E ´x, pψt; pQ¯ˇˇˇ
Now we can invoke the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s Theorem B.1 to bound each term appearing above
separately. The batch of problems Ft can be seen as independent draws from both distributions
Q and pQ. It therefore follows that with probability 1´ δ over the draws of the batch Ft,
ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψt;Q¯´ E ´x, pψt; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď 2
d
log p4{δq
2m0
We now use Equation (25) to translate this bound to a bound for pψ. We have that for any x P X ,
with probability at least 1´ δ over the draws of all problems F ,
ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď 2d log p4T {δq
2m0
(26)
And therefore, with probability at least 1´ δ over all problems F , for all i P rns,
ˇˇˇ
E
´
xi, pψ;Q¯´ E ´xi, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď 2
d
log p4nT {δq
2m0
ď να (27)
where the second inequality follows from Assumption 3.1 on m0. Now by a simple triangle
inequality
P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯
ď P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ Epx, pψ; pQqˇˇˇ ą α¯` P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
Epx, pψ; pQq ´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 3α¯
The first term appearing in the RHS of the above inequality is zero with probability 1´ δ over F
following Inequality (27). The second term is zero with probability 1´ δ over F as well following
the in-sample guarantees provided in Theorem 3.3. Therefore, we conclude that for any set of
observed individuals X, with probability at least 1´ 2δ over the observed labelings F , as long as
Assumption 3.1:
m “ T ¨m0 ě O
ˆ
T log pnT {δq
ν2α2
˙
“ rOˆ log pnq log pn{δq
ν4α4
˙
(28)
holds, the mapping pψ satisfies p4α, 0q-AIF with respect to the distributions ´ pP,Q¯:
P
x„ pP
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 4α¯ “ 0
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Now let’s look at the generalization (with respect to Q) error of pψ. Let
ψ‹ “ ψ‹
´
α; pP,Q¯ , γ‹ “ γ‹ ´α; pP,Q¯ , err´ψ‹; pP,Q¯ “ OPT´α; pP,Q¯
be defined as in Definition 3.1. We would like to compare the accuracy of pψ with respect to
the distributions pP and Q, i.e. err´ pψ; pP,Q¯, to OPT´α; pP,Q¯ as a benchmark. We follow
the same approach we used in the proof of Theorem 3.4 to achieve an upper bound for the
difference between pψ’s error and the optimal error. It follows directly from Inequality (27) that
with probability 1´ δ over the problems F , as long as the sample complexity (28) is satisfied,ˇˇˇ
err
´ pψ; pP,Q¯´ err´ pψ; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ “ ˇˇˇˇˇ 1n
nÿ
i“1
E
´
xi, pψ;Q¯´ 1
n
nÿ
i“1
E
´
xi, pψ; pQ¯
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ ď να (29)
and that by a simple application of the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality, as long as the sample
complexity (28) is satisfied, with probability 1´ δ over F we have thatˇˇˇ
err
´
ψ‹; pP,Q¯´ err´ψ‹; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď O pναq (30)
On the other hand, with probability 1´δ over F , the pair pψ‹|F , γ‹q – where ψ‹|F is the mapping
ψ‹ restricted to the problems F – is feasible in the empirical learning problem (4). Because, with
probability 1´ δ as long as the sample complexity (28) is satisfied:ˇˇˇ
E
´
xi, ψ
‹|F ; pQ¯´ γ‹ ˇˇˇ ď ˇˇˇE ´xi, ψ‹|F ; pQ¯´ E pxi, ψ‹;Qqˇˇˇ` |E pxi, ψ‹;Qq ´ γ‹| ď α` α “ 2α
Therefore, by Theorem 3.3, we have that with probability 1´ δ over F ,
err
´ pψ; pP, pQ¯ “ err´p; pP, pQ¯ ď err´ψ‹|F ; pP, pQ¯` 2ν “ err´ψ‹; pP, pQ¯` 2ν (31)
Putting together Inequalities (29), (30), and (31), we conclude that for any X, with probability
at least 1´ 4δ over the problems F ,
err
´ pψ; pP,Q¯ ď OPT´α; pP,Q¯`O pνq
B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.6: Simultaneous Generalization over P and Q
We have proved so far:
• Theorem 3.4 (Generalization over P):
´ pP, pQ¯ liftedÝÑ ´P, pQ¯.
• Theorem 3.5 (Generalization over Q):
´ pP, pQ¯ liftedÝÑ ´ pP,Q¯
Before we prove Theorem 3.6 which considers simultaneous generalization over both distributions
P and Q, we first prove the following Lemma B.5. Notice when proving the final generalization
theorem, we take the following natural two steps in lifting the guarantees:´ pP, pQ¯Ñ ´P, pQ¯Ñ pP,Qq
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The first step of the above scheme is exactly what we have proved in Theorem 3.4. However,
we cannot directly invoke Theorem 3.5 to prove the second step since we had the empirical
distribution of individuals (i.e. pP) in that theorem. In the following Lemma, we basically prove
the second step where the distribution over individuals is P.
Lemma B.5. Suppose
n ě rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
, m ě rOˆ log pnq log pn{δq
ν4α4
˙
and let pψ “ pψ ´X,xW¯ be the output of Algorithm 2. We have that for any X, with probability at
least 1´ 2δ over the problems F ,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ ď β
and that ˇˇˇ
err
´ pψ;P,Q¯´ err´ pψ;P, pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď O pαβq `O pναq
Proof. Let’s prove the first part of the Lemma. Let X 1 “ tx1iuni“1 Ď X n be – any – set of n
individuals. Recall that Inequality (26) developed in the proof of Theorem 3.5 implies with
probability 1´ δ over the problems F , for all i P rns:
ˇˇˇ
E
´
x1i, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x1i, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď 2
d
log p4nT {δq
2m0
ď να
In other words, if pP 1 represents the uniform distribution over X 1, we have that for any X 1 Ď X n,
with probability at least 1´ δ over F ,
P
x„ pP 1
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ “ 0 (32)
This doesn’t give us what we want because this inequality works for any distribution with support
of size at most n while we want a guarantee for any x „ P and that P might have an infinite-sized
support. For random variables F , consider the event A pF q:
A pF q “
"
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ ą β*
We eventually want to show that PF rA pF qs is small. Following the guarantee of (32) we consider
an auxiliary data set of individuals X 1 to argue that PF rA pF qs is in fact small. To formalize
our argument, let X 1 “ tx1iuni“1 „ Pn be a new set of n individuals drawn independently from
the distribution P and let pP 1 denote the uniform distribution over X 1. Define events B pF,X 1q
and C pF,X 1q which depend on both F and X 1:
B
`
F,X 1
˘ “"ˇˇˇˇ
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯´ P
x„ pP 1
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ˇˇˇˇ ą β*
C
`
F,X 1
˘ “ " P
x„ pP 1
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯ ‰ 0*
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We have that
PF rA pF qs “ PF,X 1 rA pF qs
ď PF,X 1
“
B
`
F,X 1
˘‰` PF,X 1 “C `F,X 1˘‰ pfollows from a triangle inequalityq
“ EF
“
PX 1
“
B
`
F,X 1
˘‰‰` EX 1 “PF “C `F,X 1˘‰‰
But Inequality (32) implies for any X 1, PF rC pF,X 1qs ď δ. And that by a simple application of
the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality, as long as the sample complexity for n stated in the Lemma
is met, we have that for any F , PX 1 rB pF,X 1qs ď δ. We have therefore shown that
PF rA pF qs ď 2δ
proving the first part of the Lemma. The second part of the Lemma can be proved similarly
with the same idea of considering an auxiliary data set X 1 „ Pn. Skipping the details, we can in
fact show that with probability 1´ 2δ over F ,ˇˇˇ
err
´ pψ;P,Q¯´ err´ pψ;P, pQ¯ˇˇˇ
ď E
x„P
ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ
ď
ˇˇˇˇ
E
x„P
ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ´ E
x„ pP 1
ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇˇˇˇˇ
` E
x„ pP 1
ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ
ď O pαβq `O pναq
Proof of Theorem 3.6. First, observe that by a traingle inequality
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 6α¯
ď P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ E ´x, pψ; pQ¯ˇˇˇ ą α¯` P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ; pQ¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 5α¯
We will argue that as long as,
n ě rO˜mdH ` log `1{ν2δ˘
α2β2
¸
, m ě rOˆ log pnq log pn{δq
ν4α4
˙
we can further bound the above inequality by 2β. Lemma B.5 implies for any X, the first term
appearing in the RHS of the above inequality is bounded by β with probability 1´ 2δ over the
problems F . The second term is bounded by β as well by Theorem 3.4 with probability 1´ 3δ
over the observed individuals and problems pX,F q (in the theorem we actually state w.p. 1´ 6δ
because 3δ comes from the accuracy guarantee). Putting these two pieces together, we have that
with probability at least 1´ 5δ over the data set pX,F q,
P
x„P
´ˇˇˇ
E
´
x, pψ;Q¯´ pγ ˇˇˇ ą 6α¯ ď 2β
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which implies pψ satisfies p6α, 2βq-AIF with respect to the distributions pP,Qq. Now let’s look at
the generalization error of pψ. Let
ψ‹ “ ψ‹ pα;P,Qq , γ‹ “ γ‹ pα;P,Qq , err pψ‹;P,Qq “ OPT pα;P,Qq
be defined as in Definition 3.1. We will again use the triangle inequality to write:ˇˇˇ
err
´ pψ;P,Q¯´ err´ pψ; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď ˇˇˇerr´ pψ;P,Q¯´ err´ pψ;P, pQ¯ˇˇˇ
`
ˇˇˇ
err
´ pψ;P, pQ¯´ err´ pψ; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ
It follows from Lemma B.5 that the first term appearing in the RHS is bounded by O pαβq`O pναq
with probability 1´ 2δ over the problems F , and we also have that the second term is bounded
by O pαβq as well with probability 1 ´ δ over the individuals X (see (24)). Therefore, with
probability 1´ 3δ over the data set pX,F q,ˇˇˇ
err
´ pψ;P,Q¯´ err´ pψ; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď O pαβq `O pναq
It follows similarly that with probability 1´ 2δ over X and F ,ˇˇˇ
err pψ‹;P,Qq ´ err
´
ψ‹; pP, pQ¯ˇˇˇ ď O pαβq `O pναq
and as in the proof of Theorem 3.5, we can show that with probability 1´ δ over F , the pair
pψ‹|F , γ‹q – where ψ‹|F is the mapping ψ‹ restricted to the domain F – is feasible in the empirical
fair learning problem (4), which again implies by Theorem 3.3 that with probability 1´ δ over F
err
´ pψ; pP, pQ¯ “ err´p; pP, pQ¯ ď err´ψ‹|F ; pP, pQ¯` 2ν “ err´ψ‹; pP, pQ¯` 2ν
Putting all inequalities together, we have that with probability 1´ 7δ over pX,F q,
err
´ pψ;P,Q¯ ď OPT pα;P,Qq `O pνq `O pαβq
C Proofs of Section A
We prove only the regret bounds of the players (Lemma A.1 and A.2) in this section. The rest of
the proofs are similar to their counterparts in the AIF section.
C.1 Regret Bounds
Proof of Lemma A.1. Recall the Learner is accumulating regret only because they are using the
given quantities trρiuni“1 instead of tpρiuni“1 that depend on the observed data F . In other words,
at round t P rT s of the algorithm instead of best responding to
L
´
h, γ,λt
¯
“ ´γ
nÿ
i“1
wi,t
` 1
m
mÿ
j“1
#
nÿ
i“1
ˆ
1
n
` wi,tpρi
˙
1 rhjpxiq “ 1, fjpxiq “ 0s `
ˆ
1
n
˙
1 rhjpxiq “ 0, fjpxiq “ 1s
+
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The Learner is in fact minimizing
rL´h, γ,λt¯ “ ´γ nÿ
i“1
wi,t
` 1
m
mÿ
j“1
#
nÿ
i“1
ˆ
1
n
` wi,trρi
˙
1 rhjpxiq “ 1, fjpxiq “ 0s `
ˆ
1
n
˙
1 rhjpxiq “ 0, fjpxiq “ 1s
+
Observe that for any pair of
´
h, γ
¯
,
ˇˇˇ
L
´
h, γ,λt
¯
´ rL´h, γ,λt¯ˇˇˇ ď 1
m
mÿ
j“1
nÿ
i“1
ˇˇˇˇ
wi,trρi ´ wi,tpρi
ˇˇˇˇ
1 rhjpxiq “ 1, fjpxiq “ 0s
ď
nÿ
i“1
ˇˇˇˇ
wi,trρi ´ wi,tpρi
ˇˇˇˇ
1
m
mÿ
j“1
1 rfjpxiq “ 0s
“
nÿ
i“1
pρi ˇˇˇˇwi,trρi ´ wi,tpρi
ˇˇˇˇ
ď
nÿ
i“1
|pρi ´ rρi| ¨ |wi,t|rρi
A simple application of Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem B.1) implies with probability
1´ δ over the observed labelings F , uniformly for all i,
|pρi ´ ρi| ď
d
log p2n{δq
2m0
On the other hand by Assumption A.1, we have that for all i P rns,
|rρi ´ ρi| ď
d
log pnq
2m0
Therefore for a given t, with probability 1´ δ over F ,
ˇˇˇ
L
´
h, γ,λt
¯
´ rL´h, γ,λt¯ˇˇˇ ď 2rρmin
d
log p2n{δq
2m0
nÿ
i“1
|wi,t|
“ 2rρmin
d
log p2n{δq
2m0
nÿ
i“1
ˇˇˇ
λ`i,t ´ λ´i,t
ˇˇˇ
ď 2Brρmin
d
log p2n{δq
2m0
Now, let
´
h
‹
t , γ
‹
t
¯
“ arg min
h,γ
L
´
h, γ,λt
¯
be the best response of the Learner to L and recall
the actual play of the Learner is in fact
´
ht, γt
¯
“ arg min
h,γ
rL´h, γ,λt¯. Observe that the
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above inequality implies for any t, with probability 1´ δ over F ,
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
ď rL´ht, γt,λt¯` 2Brρmin
d
log p4n{δq
2m0
ď rL´h‹t , γ‹t ,λt¯` 2Brρmin
d
log p4n{δq
2m0
ď L
´
h
‹
t , γ
‹
t ,λt
¯
` 4Brρmin
d
log p4n{δq
2m0
It follows immediately that with probability 1´ δ over the observed labelings F , for all t P rT s
L
´
ht, γt,λt
¯
´min
p,γ
L pp, γ,λtq ď 4Brρmin
d
log p4nT {δq
2m0
which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma A.2. The proof is almost similar to that of Lemma 3.1. The terms B logp2n`1qηT `
η p1` 2αq2B come from the regret analysis of the exponentiated gradient descent algorithm.The
only difference is that now we have to bound the difference between false positive rates, one with
respect to the distribution pQ and another with respect to the distribution pQt, for all i and t:ˇˇˇ
EFP
´
xi, pψt; pQ¯´ EFP ´xi, pψt; pQt¯ˇˇˇ
Let pρi,t “ Pf„ pQt rfpxiq “ 0s and recall pρi “ Pf„ pQ rfpxiq “ 0s. We have that
EFP
´
xi, pψt; pQ¯ “ ppρiq´1 ¨ E
f„ pQ
«
P
h„ pψt,f rhpxiq “ 1, fpxiq “ 0s
ff
EFP
´
xi, pψt; pQt¯ “ ppρi,tq´1 ¨ E
f„ pQt
«
P
h„ pψt,f rhpxiq “ 1, fpxiq “ 0s
ff
And thereforeˇˇˇ
EFP
´
xi, pψt; pQ¯´ EFP ´xi, pψt; pQt¯ˇˇˇ
ď 1pρi
#ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ Ef„ pQ
«
P
h„ pψt,f rhpxiq “ 1, fpxiq “ 0s
ff
´ E
f„ pQt
«
P
h„ pψt,f rhpxiq “ 1, fpxiq “ 0s
ffˇˇˇˇ
ˇ` |pρi ´ pρi,t|
+
This inequality follows from the simple fact that for a ď b and c ď d, all in R`:ˇˇˇa
b
´ c
d
ˇˇˇ
“
ˇˇˇa
b
´ c
b
` c
b
´ c
d
ˇˇˇ
ď 1
b
|a´ c| ` c
ˇˇˇˇ
1
b
´ 1
d
ˇˇˇˇ
ď 1
b
|a´ c| ` 1
b
|b´ d|
Now by viewing the batch Ft as a random sample from the set of problems F , we can apply
the Chernoff-Hoeffding’s inequality to bound each difference appearing above separately. We
therefore have that with probability 1´ δ over the draws of Ft:ˇˇˇ
EFP
´
xi, pψt; pQ¯´ EFP ´xi, pψt; pQt¯ˇˇˇ ď 2pρi
d
log p4{δq
2m0
The rest is similar to how the proof for Lemma 3.1 proceeds.
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D Additional Experimental Results
(a) convergence plot: synthetic data (b) error spread plot: synthetic data
Figure 3: (a) Error-unfairness trajectory plots illustrating the convergence of algorithm AIF-Learn. (b) Error-
unfairness tradeoffs and individual errors for AIF-Learn vs. simple mixtures of the error-optimal model and
random classification. Gray dots are shifted upwards slightly to avoid occlusions.
In addition to the experiments on the Communities and Crime data set, we ran additional
experiments on synthetic data sets to further verify the performance of our algorithms empirically.
Given the parameters n (number of individuals), m (number of problems), d (dimension), and a
coin with bias q ě 0.5, an instance of the synthetic data is generated as follows:
First n individuals txiuni“1 are generated randomly where xi P t˘1ud. Let the first 75% of the
individuals be called “group 1” and the rest “group 2”. For each learning task j P rms, we
randomly sample two weight vectors wj,maj, wj,min P t˘1ud. Now consider a matrix Y P t0, 1unˆm
that needs to be filled in with labels. We intentionally inject unfairness into the data set (because
otherwise fairness would be achieved for free due to the random generation of data) by considering
“majority” and “minority” groups for each learning task (majority group will be labelled using
wj,maj and the minority by wj,min). For each learning task j, individuals in group 1 get q chance
of falling into the majority group of that task and individuals in group 2 get 1 ´ q chance
(this is implemented by flipping a coin with bias q for each individual). Once the majority and
minority groups for each learning task are specified, the labels Y “ ryijs are set according to
yij “ signpwTi,j xiq where wi,j P twj,maj, wj,minu. (Notice q “ 1 corresponds to a fixed (across
learning tasks) majority group of size 0.75n, and q “ 0.5 corresponds to the case where the
majority groups are formed completely at random and that they have size 0.5n in expectation.)
It is “expected” that solving the unconstrained learning problem on an instance of the above
synthetic data generation process would result in discrimination against the minority groups
which are formed mostly by the individuals in group 2, and therefore our algorithm should
provide a fix for this unfair treatment. We therefore took an instance of the synthetic data set
with parameters n “ 200,m “ 50, d “ 20, q “ 0.8 and ran our algorithm on varying values of
allowed fairness violation 2α (notice on an input α to the algorithm, the individual error rates
are allowed to be within at most 2α of each other). We present the results (which are reported
in-sample) in Figure 3 where similar to the results on the Communities and Crime data set, we
get convergence after T “ 1000 iterations (or 50,000 calls to the learning oracle, see Figure 3(a)).
Furthermore, Figure 3(b) suggests that our algorithm on the synthetic data set considerably
outperforms the baseline that only mixes the error-optimal model with random classification.
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